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Mortgaging Human Capital: Federally 
Funded Subprime Higher Education 
Jean Braucher∗ 
Abstract 
The for-profit higher education sector, primarily funded by 
federal student aid dollars, produces both the highest debts and 
defaults and lowest completion rates for its students. In response, 
the U.S. Department of Education (DOE) has promulgated the 
Gainful Employment Rule to require for-profit colleges and 
universities to meet either repayment or debt-to-income 
benchmarks to remain eligible to receive federal Higher Education 
Act funding. This Article describes the business model of the 
career colleges and their rapid growth over the last decade, the 
history of proprietary school regulation, the limited remedies for 
overindebtedness of former students, and the tests imposed by the 
DOE rule. Although weakened after a massive lobbying effort, the 
Gainful Employment Rule as promulgated still promises to put 
some of the worst performing for-profit programs out of the 
business of operating on a federal dole. This Article compares the 
bubbles in for-profit higher education and subprime mortgages, 
both of which involved federal encouragement of high risk-taking 
to achieve the American Dream. It concludes by questioning the 
federal policy of relying on for-profit schools to meet national 
higher education goals. 
                                                                                                     
 ∗ Roger C. Henderson Professor of Law, University of Arizona. Earlier 
versions of this article were presented at the Washington and Lee Law Review 
Symposium on Regulation in the Fringe Economy in Lexington, Va., in October 
2011 and at the meetings of the Law and Society Association in San Francisco 
and the International Association for Consumer Law at Brunel University in 
London, both in June 2011. Thanks to participants in those meetings for 
comments and a particular thanks to the law review students at Washington 
and Lee University School of Law for their exemplary attention to detail in 
every aspect of planning for the Fringe Economy symposium. 
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I. Introduction 
For-profit colleges have expanded rapidly in the last decade, 
using primarily federal student grant and loan funds for their 
revenue.1 As will be detailed here, these schools, also known as 
                                                                                                     
 1. See infra Part II.D (discussing for-profit colleges’ disproportionate 
reliance on federal funds). Not included in the analysis of this Article are for-
profit institutions that do not receive federal student aid and thus do not report 
under these programs.  See Stephanie Riegg Cellini and Claudia Goldin, Does 
Federal Student Aid Raise Tuition? New Evidence on For-Profit Colleges, NBER 
Working Paper No. 17827 (2012), available at http://www.nber.org/ 
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career or proprietary colleges, produce on average significantly 
higher debt burdens and default rates for former students than 
other sectors of higher education, indicating many of the for-
profit colleges do not achieve their mission of preparing students 
for “gainful employment.”2 Because so many former students of 
these institutions will not be able to repay, it is appropriate to 
classify for-profit higher education as involving fringe credit.3 
Even though much of the credit is in the form of federal student 
loans with reasonable interest rates,4 the label “subprime higher 
education” accurately captures the nature of the risk to 
individual students. Some students in addition take out private 
loans to go to for-profit colleges, further upping the risk of 
default.5 Furthermore, the demographic profiles of those taking 
                                                                                                     
papers/w17827 (in a study based on data from agencies in five states, Florida, 
Michigan, Missouri, Tennessee, and Wisconsin, estimating that exclusion from 
federal data of for-profit schools not participating in federal student aid 
programs may result in understatement by half of the number of  for-profit 
postsecondary schools and by about 37% of enrollment in the for-profit sector).  
This Article focuses on the for-profit schools that rely on revenue from federal 
student aid programs and the resulting overindebtedness, so not too much is 
lost by not including in the analysis new data from five states about schools that 
are mostly non-degree granting vocational programs and thus not part of the 
federal drive to attain universal higher education.  See infra note 223 and 
accompanying text.  At any rate these data were made public too late to be 
taken into account here. 
 2. See infra Parts II.E, III.B (discussing high dropout and loan default 
rates at for-profit colleges, and discussing the Gainful Employment Rule). 
 3. See infra Part II.E (discussing difficulty in loan repayment experienced 
by former students of for-profit schools). 
 4. COLLEGE BOARD, TRENDS IN STUDENT AID 15 (2011) [hereinafter TRENDS 
IN STUDENT AID 2011] (reporting interest rates on various federal loans ranging 
from 3.4% to 6.8% in 2011–2012). There have been huge changes in the mix of 
higher education loans in recent years: as of July 1, 2010, the federal 
government stopped guaranteeing educational loans made by private lenders in 
favor of providing direct federal student loans. Id. at 8–9. Also, the private 
student loan market shrank dramatically after the financial crisis of 2008, from 
$22.1 billion in 2007–2008 to $6 billion in 2010–2011. See id. at 4, 10.  
 5. See Project on Student Debt, PRIVATE LOANS: FACTS AND TRENDS 1 (July 
2011) (reporting that 42% of for-profit students used private loans in 2007–2008, 
up from 12% in 2003–2004, and compared to 25% of students at private 
nonprofit four-year schools in 2007–2008, 14% of students at public four-year 
schools, and 4% of students at public two-year schools), available at 
http://projectonstudentdebt.org/files/pub/private_loan_facts_trends.pdf. Although 
private student loans have dropped sharply since 2007–2008, students who use 
them pay higher interest rates than on federal loans; furthermore, for-profit 
schools have responded to the decline in the private student loan supply by 
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out student loans to go to for-profit schools—disproportionately 
poor, minority, single parents, and military personnel—are 
similar to the targets of other fringe credit providers, such as 
payday lenders and the purveyors of subprime mortgages 
involved in the mortgage crisis.6 The limited academic 
preparation of many career college students contributes to the 
high-stakes gamble of taking on large educational debt.7 
                                                                                                     
making loans themselves. See TRENDS IN STUDENT AID 2011, supra note 4, at 9, 
13; see also infra Part II.D (explaining that schools cannot receive more than 
90% of their revenue from federal higher education aid programs, so making 
loans to their own students is a way to comply with this federal restriction).  
 6. See Program Integrity: Gainful Employment, 75 Fed. Reg. 43,616, 
43,654 (proposed July 26, 2010) [hereinafter Proposed Gainful Employment 
Rule Analysis] (discussing argument of the for-profit industry that their high 
default rates are due to enrolling different types of students, particularly low-
income students, and rejecting it on the basis that the industry’s own 
assessment found that differences in student characteristics accounted for only 
about half of the difference in defaults) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. § 668); id. at 
43,655 (discussing responsibility of institutions to recruit and enroll students 
who can succeed at their institutions and quoting a blog post of Judge Richard 
Posner comparing aggressive marketing of for-profit colleges to vulnerable low-
income persons lacking in financial sophistication to the marketing of mortgage 
loans during the housing bubble); see also Complaint and Prayer for Declaratory 
and Injunctive Relief ¶ 21, Career Coll. Ass’n v. Duncan, Docket No. 1:11-cv-
01314 (July 20, 2011), available at http://www.apscu.org/iMISPublic/ 
Content/ContentFolders/WhatsHot/GainfulEmploymentComplaint-07202011-
StampedCopy.pdf (emphasizing that career colleges serve “nontraditional 
students” and giving these statistics about their students: “76% live 
independently without parental support, 63% are over 24 years old, 54% delayed 
postsecondary education after high school, 45% have parents who did not go to 
school beyond high school, 47% have dependent children, 40% are minorities, 
and 31% are single parents”); Steven Eisman, Subprime Goes to College, 
Presentation at the Ira Sohn Conference (May 26, 2010), available at 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/32066986/Steve-Eisman-Ira-Sohn-Conference-May-2010 
(comparing the bubble in subprime mortgages with the growth in the for-profit 
college sector); Steven Eisman, Subprime Goes To College, Testimony Before the 
U.S. Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions, (June 24, 
2010), available at http://help.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Eisman.pdf; MAMIE 
LYNCH ET AL., THE EDUCATION TRUST, SUBPRIME OPPORTUNITY: THE UNFULFILLED 
PROMISE OF FOR-PROFIT COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES (Nov. 2010) available at 
http://www.educacion2020.cl/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_down 
load&gid=141&Itemid=55 (discussing poor results for minority and low-income 
students who attend for-profit institutions).  
 7. See Complaint and Prayer for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra 
note 6, ¶¶ 6–7 (arguing that the DOE’s Gainful Employment Rule, 34 C.F.R. 
§ 668.7 (2011), targets “the quality of a school’s enrollees” rather than the 
quality of its programs and creates “massive disincentives” to serving “low-
income, minority, and other traditionally underserved student populations” who 
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Lately there is much discussion of whether higher education 
in general is “worth it.”8 The answer is likely to be no for much of 
subprime higher education, as will be detailed below. Under a 
principle of “worst things first,” for-profit colleges deserve 
regulatory and enforcement attention. That other higher 
education could benefit from reform, too, is not grounds for 
ignoring the need for targeted regulation of for-profit colleges.9 At 
                                                                                                     
are “the most at risk” of not meeting new regulatory tests based on repayment 
and debt-to-income ratios); infra Part III.B (discussing the tests under the new 
Gainful Employment Rule). 
 8. See e.g., Pew Research Center, Is College Worth It?: College Presidents, 
Public Assess Value, Quality and Mission of Higher Education, SOCIAL & 
DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS, May 16, 2011, available at http://www.pewsocial 
trends.org/files/2011/05/higher-ed-report.pdf (presenting evidence that, despite 
growing dissatisfaction with the price, both rates of employment and incomes 
increase with a college education, as well as health, happiness, rates of 
marriage, sense of personal intellectual development and other forms of 
personal satisfaction, and prospects of graduates’ children). The dissatisfaction 
with the price is in part a matter of decreased public subsidy, particularly for 
public universities. See infra Part IV.B (discussing the recent decline in 
subsidies resulting from state budget crunches). Concerning the difference 
between the sticker price and the price paid in different sectors of higher 
education, for-profit higher education has a higher net price than public 
university education and much of private nonprofit higher education. Price, 
however, must be distinguished from cost; the cost of for-profit education is 
relatively low, compared to prime higher education, which involves significant 
public and philanthropic support. See id. (discussing the fact that despite the 
high price to students, the production cost of education at for-profit schools is 
relatively low). 
 9. There is a great deal of variation within the various sectors of higher 
education, whether for-profit, public, or private nonprofit. See Amanda Harmon 
Cooley & Aaron Cooley, From Diploma Mills to For-Profit Colleges and 
Universities: Business Opportunities, Regulatory Challenges, and Consumer 
Responsibility in Higher Education, 18 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 505, 506–07 
(2009) (discussing variations in form and success within the for-profit sector); 
see also Proposed Gainful Employment Rule Analysis, supra note 6, at 43,654 
(discussing variations in default-completion ratios within sectors); U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-600, PROPRIETARY SCHOOLS: STRONGER 
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION OVERSIGHT NEEDED TO HELP ENSURE ONLY ELIGIBLE 
STUDENTS RECEIVE FEDERAL STUDENT AID 18–19 (2009) (noting that some 
proprietary schools have low loan default rates). Nonetheless, targeted 
regulation of the for-profit sector based on loan repayment and debt-to-income 
ratios can be justified in light of these schools’ different missions. The Pew 
Report discusses the difference in the missions of the schools through the lens of 
what their presidents’ say about them: “Seven-in-ten heads of four-year public 
and private colleges emphasize intellectual and personal growth, while about 
two-thirds of the heads of two-year and for-profit colleges emphasize career 
preparation.” Pew Research Center, supra note 8, at 15. Career preparation is 
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a minimum, that regulation should put the worst performers out 
of the business of living on federal funds, which is what the U.S. 
Department of Education (DOE) plans to do under its new 
Gainful Employment Rule,10 scheduled to go into effect July 1, 
2012.11 This rule will not eliminate the waste of taxpayer dollars 
or the human pain to former students caused by this industry,12 
but it is a start. In addition, it is worth noting that the growing 
problem of student loan overindebtedness generally, in the public 
and nonprofit sectors as well as in the for-profit sector, has been 
underexplored in the legal literature. Many more legal scholars 
could profitably turn to critical analysis of the student-loan debt 
problem in its multiple manifestations, particularly the need for 
preventative regulation as well as after-the-fact remedies.13 This 
Article is a first effort to analyze the current state of regulation of 
career colleges’ eligibility for federal student aid funds. 
While students’ risk in the pursuit of subprime higher 
education has become reasonably well-known through media 
coverage,14 it is not necessarily so well understood that there is a 
                                                                                                     
not easy to measure, but it is simple compared to measuring intellectual and 
personal growth. See Creola Johnson, Credentialism and the Proliferation of 
Fake Degrees: The Employer Pretends to Need a Degree: The Employee Pretends 
to Have One, 23 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 269, 288–93 (2006) (discussing the 
instrumentalism that can overtake loftier goals; as a result the goal of career 
colleges may not be anything more than providing a credential, a goal that may 
be shared by student and institutional provider alike). 
 10. Gainful Employment in a Recognized Occupation, 34 C.F.R. § 668.7 
(2011) [hereinafter Gainful Employment Rule]. 
 11. See Program Integrity: Gainful Employment—Debt Measures, 76 Fed. 
Reg. 34386, 34387 (June 13, 2011) [hereinafter Gainful Employment Rule 
Analysis] (explaining that the regulation aims to “protect students by removing 
eligibility [for federal loans] from the worst performing programs that fail the 
minimum requirements”) (codified at 34 C.F.R. § 668). 
 12. See infra notes 168, 190 and accompanying text (concerning 
consequences to former students who default on student loans). 
 13. Some excellent work has been done on the need for debt relief for 
former students and the lack of a compelling justification for treating them 
worse than debtors on other types of credit. See e.g., John A.E. Pottow, The 
Nondischargeability of Student Loans in Personal Bankruptcy Proceedings: The 
Search for a Theory, 44 CAN. BUS. L.J. 245, 266, 276 (2006) (arguing that “there 
are no compelling empirical data to buttress the myth that students defraud 
creditors any more than other debtors” and advocating “the adoption of an 
income-contingent model of debt repayment” that would dry up the market for 
“sub-prime schools [that] target a financially vulnerable client base”). 
 14. See, e.g., Tamar Lewin, Student Loan Default Rates Rise Sharply in 
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federal policy of fostering career colleges using student aid funds. 
This is not just a de facto policy resulting from the considerable 
talent of the for-profit sector in sucking up federal student aid 
dollars. Rather, the policy is by federal design. For example, after 
noting a recent tripling in for-profit college enrollment, DOE 
stated in July of 2010 “[t]his trend is promising and supports 
President Obama’s goal of leading the world in the percentage of 
college graduates by 2020. The President’s goal cannot be 
achieved without a healthy and productive higher education for-
profit sector.”15 
Regulation of for-profit colleges has been very light, and a 
planned step-up in federal oversight under the Gainful 
Employment Rule—assuming it is not blocked as a result of an 
industry lawsuit16—will still be weak, as DOE concedes.17 The 
                                                                                                     
Past Year, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2011, at A14 (noting that for-profit colleges 
have led the way in recent default rate increases and that although they 
enrolled about 10% of the nation’s undergraduates, they accounted for almost 
half the defaults); Melissa Korn, For-Profit Schools Increasingly Find the Party 
Is Over, WALL ST. J., Aug. 23, 2011, at B1 (discussing student resistance to debt 
and risk). 
 15. Proposed Gainful Employment Rule Analysis, supra note 6, at 43,617, 
43,641. President Obama has frequently decried the nation’s decline in the rate 
of college education compared to other nations. See, e.g., President Barack 
Obama, Speech at the University of Texas at Austin (Aug. 9, 2010), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/08/09/remarks-president-higher- 
education-and-economy-university-texas-austin (lamenting decline in one 
generation from first place to twelfth).  See also infra note 219 (concerning U.S. 
rate of college graduation in relation to other nations). While DOE claims to 
have a policy of supporting for-profit education, this could be seen as making the 
best of a congressional mandate to provide federal student aid to this sector. See 
infra note 113 and accompanying text (concerning proprietary schools becoming 
eligible to receive federal student aid funds in 1972); infra Part IV.B 
(questioning reliance on for-profit higher education to meet national education 
goals). 
 16. Complaint and Prayer for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 
6, ¶¶ 1–13 (seeking, inter alia, to enjoin enforcement of the Gainful Employment 
Rule). 
 17. See Proposed Gainful Employment Rule Analysis, supra note 6, at 
43,657 (concerning the history of “barest minimum enforcement” of statutory 
requirement that for-profit colleges prepare students for gainful employment in 
a recognized occupation; colleges have been required to check a box so stating); 
id at 43,620 (in proposed regulation, targeting schools at which “it becomes 
unambiguous that a program’s debt levels are excessive”). That proposed 
regulation was later watered down. See Gainful Employment Rule Analysis, 
supra note 11, at 34,393–95 (June 13, 2011) (lowering required repayment rates 
for eligibility to 35%) (codified at 34 C.F.R. § 668); infra Part III.B. 
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rule focuses on students’ ability to repay their student loans and 
thus avoids direct quality regulation, which is difficult at best,18 
and at any rate not authorized by the Higher Education Act.19 
This Article questions the federal policy of relying on career 
colleges to increase the level of higher education in the 
population. It also seeks to highlight the irony of setting low 
performance standards for the for-profit schools while providing 
insufficient debt relief for the substantial numbers of their former 
students who do not benefit from the education and who end up 
with unmanageable federal and private student loans and lack of 
access to a bankruptcy discharge.20 If career colleges cannot be 
expected to reduce their default rates to the levels of other sectors 
of higher education, their former students should not be hounded 
to the grave for repayment. In its Gainful Employment Rule, set 
to go into effect July 1, 2012, DOE takes the position that high 
levels of federal student loan default are tolerable; the rule allows 
schools to remain eligible to receive federal student aid funds if 
                                                                                                     
 18. See Marc T. Law & Sukkoo Kim, Specialization and Regulation: The 
Rise of Professionals and the Emergence of Occupational Licensing Regulation, 
65 J. ECON. HIST. 723, 732–36 (2005) (discussing difficulty of regulation to 
ensure quality under conditions of asymmetric information, in which the seller 
understands quality better than the consumer); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFFICE, GAO-12-150, FOR-PROFIT SCHOOLS: EXPERIENCES OF UNDERCOVER 
STUDENTS ENROLLED IN ONLINE CLASSES AT SELECTED COLLEGES 2 (2011) (stating 
that undercover investigators who attempted to enroll in 15 for-profit colleges, 
including the largest five, were able to enroll in twelve with fictitious high 
school graduation credentials and that at six of these colleges, instructors gave 
credit for plagiarized, unresponsive, or incorrect assignments). 
 19. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232a (2006) (depriving DOE of any authority over 
curricula or administration of institutions of higher education); see also GAO-09-
600, supra note 9, at 8 (noting that under the Higher Education Act, DOE does 
not determine the quality of higher education, which is left to accrediting 
agencies). Accrediting agencies, however, are not necessarily regulating quality 
of the for-profit schools well. See TOM HARKIN, CHAIRMAN, S. COMM. ON HEALTH, 
EDUC., LABOR, AND PENSIONS, EMERGING RISK?: AN OVERVIEW OF GROWTH, 
SPENDING, STUDENT DEBT AND UNANSWERED QUESTIONS IN FOR-PROFIT HIGHER 
EDUCATION 2–3 (2010) [hereinafter HARKIN, EMERGING RISK?] (noting the 
practice of for-profit schools buying small regionally accredited schools and 
expanding dramatically, in particular into virtual education, under the same 
accreditation). Higher education accreditation should be examined by legal 
scholars; a detailed critique of its operations is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 20. See infra Part III.C (discussing the lack of sufficient debt relief for 
student loans, particularly in bankruptcy); see also 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(8), 
1328(a)(2) (2006) (excepting educational loans from the bankruptcy discharge 
absent “undue hardship”). 
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they maintain repayment rates of only 35% over three out of four 
years, meaning the rest of the former students are not repaying 
any principal.21 The agency does so despite explicitly recognizing 
the high risk for any individual student.22 If federal policy is to 
continue promoting this personal risk-taking, it is time for 
Congress to amend the Bankruptcy Code to return to the 
approach of making student-loan debt dischargeable, perhaps 
with a delay after leaving school.23 
This Article describes the business model of for-profit colleges 
in Part II. In Part III, it explains the federal government’s role in 
promoting them and also situates the current government 
position in the sweep of federal policy concerning for-profit higher 
education and student loans over the last half century. Finally, 
Part IV compares and contrasts the boom in subprime higher 
education to that in subprime mortgages. The dollar volume of 
loans for subprime higher education does not approach that of 
subprime mortgages,24 but the human cost of both credit 
complexes is high.25 There are many other similarities. These 
include, as already mentioned, high risk of default and the 
demographics of the borrowers. Also striking is how both types of 
loan have been promoted as a way to achieve the American 
Dream;26 yet the dream too often has proven unattainable.27 The 
                                                                                                     
 21. See Gainful Employment Rule, supra note 10; infra Part III.B 
(discussing the Gainful Employment Rule). 
 22. See Proposed Gainful Employment Rule Analysis, supra note 6, at 
43,622 (noting “while higher education generally brings higher earnings, there 
is no guarantee for the individual”). 
 23. See infra Part III.C. 
 24. See U.S. Census Bureau, Table 1192 Mortgage Debt Outstanding by 
Type of Property and Holder: 1990–2010 (2012), http://www.census.gov/ 
compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s1192.pdf (last visited Apr. 10, 2012) (showing 
that total U.S. mortgage debt outstanding is about ten times total student-loan 
debt) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 25. See infra notes 168, 190, 211. 
 26. LYNCH ET AL., supra note 6, at 1.  
 27. See id. (noting that homeownership is “the cornerstone of the American 
Dream”). Lynch states that:  
[t]he developing showdown between for-profit colleges and the 
government is another example of how the aspirations of the 
underserved and the unfulfilled promise of the American Dream 
combine with lax regulation to make the rich, richer and the poor, 
poorer. 
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Article ends by advocating stronger regulation that puts more 
nonperforming for-profit institutions out of the business of living 
on a federal dole, as DOE plans to do but not as aggressively as it 
should.28 
The subprime higher education bubble appears to be 
deflating as the industry hunkers down to ride out a long period 
of economic doldrums.29 Student loan defaults in this sector have 
spiked,30 but this is not the industry’s prime problem now. When 
borrowers default on federal student loans, the colleges typically 
already have the money;31 the bailout is prepackaged. The 
current problem for the industry is declining enrollments and 
thus a decline in new revenue.32 The word is getting out about the 
poor results of many career colleges and, at least for a time, fewer 
people are being suckered into a bad bet (and the colleges appear 
to be deliberately reducing recruitment to avoid enforcement 
actions and more aggressive regulation in the short term).33 But 
many former students still have to cope with the consequences of 
unmanageable debt. They gambled on the dream of a better life 
by getting a college education and ended up worse off, too often 
with huge nondischargeable debts and no improvement in job 
prospects. Beyond that, there is the question whether it is wise 
policy to try to achieve national educational goals by funneling 
federal dollars into for-profit institutions that specialize in 
evading regulation. Cutbacks in federal funds flowing to these 
institutions may be the simplest route to reform. Stronger 
regulation is needed to prevent a resurgence of the for-profit 
sector as the economy recovers. 
                                                                                                     
 28. Infra Parts III.B, IV, and V. 
 29. See infra Part II.G (discussing recent declining enrollment at for-profit 
colleges). 
 30. See infra notes 96–97 and accompanying text (reporting that from the 
2008 to the 2009 fiscal year, the cohort default rate for for-profit schools 
increased from 11.6% to 15%); infra Part II.E (discussing higher default rates 
and lower graduation rates at for-profit colleges). 
 31. Federal student aid funds are disbursed while students are in school. 
Often 100% of the funds have been disbursed by the time the student has 
completed 60% of the semester, even if the student subsequently withdraws. 34 
C.F.R. § 668.22(e)(2)(ii) (2011). 
 32. See infra Part II.G (discussing recent declining enrollment at for-profit 
colleges). 
 33. Infra Part II.G.  
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II. The Business Model of For-Profit Colleges 
For-profit colleges built their business model on rapid 
growth,34 fueled by aggressive recruiting35 and high use of federal 
student aid (both grants and loans) to pay high tuition and fees.36 
This model has produced large student debt burdens and high 
defaults.37 The defaults are symptomatic of an underlying 
pathology: although the mission of career colleges is to improve 
employability and earnings, placement in good jobs has not lived 
up to recruiters’ claims.38  
A. Enrollment Growth 
As noted at the outset, enrollment in the for-profit higher 
education sector rose rapidly in the last decade: from the fall of 
2000 to the fall of 2009, full-time enrollment in degree-granting, 
for-profit schools grew from 366,000 to 1.5 million, an increase 
from 4% to 11% of full-time college students.39 When part-time 
students are also included, the growth was from 3% to 9% of all 
college students.40 Indeed, headcounts of both full-time and part-
time students show that the number of individuals involved is 
much larger than the number of full-time students or full-time 
                                                                                                     
 34. See infra Part II.A (discussing enrollment growth at for-profit colleges 
over the last decade). 
 35. See infra Part II.B (discussing aggressive and misleading recruitment 
tactics used by for-profit school). 
 36. See infra Part II.C, D (discussing high net prices of for-profit colleges 
and their disproportionate reliance on federal funds). 
 37. See infra Part II.E (discussing higher debt-loads and default rates for 
students at for-profit colleges).  
 38. See infra Part II.B, E (discussing deceptive claims by recruiters about 
graduation rates, employment, and earning prospects after graduation from for-
profit school, and high default and low repayment rates, in part driven by low 
graduation rates at these schools). 
 39. SANDY BAUM & KATHLEEN PAYEA, TRENDS IN FOR-PROFIT 
POSTSECONDARY EDUCATION: ENROLLMENT, PRICES, STUDENT AID AND OUTCOMES 
1 (2011), http://advocacy.collegeboard.org/sites/default/files/11b_3376_Trends_ 
Brief_4Pass_110414.pdf. 
 40. Id.; see also COLLEGE BOARD, TRENDS IN COLLEGE PRICING 25 figs.17A, 
17B (2010) [hereinafter TRENDS IN COLLEGE PRICING 2010], 
http://www.naicu.edu/docLib/20101027_CollBd2010Pricing.pdf (showing full-
time and part-time enrollments in the various sectors from 2000 to 2009). 
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equivalents (FTEs).41 In 2009–2010, 3.3 million undergraduates 
and 431,000 graduate students attended for-profit schools.42 By 
2011–12, based on further growth, the for-profit sector was 
enrolling about 13% of all full-time students.43 
It is a misconception that for-profit schools operate mostly in 
the sphere of shorter or part-time programs.44 Students in the for-
profit sector are primarily enrolled in four-year degree programs 
(61% in fall 2009), with 24% of this sector’s students in two-year 
institutions and 15% in less-than-two-year schools.45 In addition, 
most students at for-profit colleges go to school full-time, at an 
even higher rate than college students as a whole.46 Among 
undergraduates in the for-profit sector, 77% are enrolled full-time 
(as of fall 2009), while for all undergraduates, 64% are full-time 
students.47 For-profit graduate programs also grew rapidly in 
recent years, with their share of degrees rising from 1% to 7% of 
all graduate degrees awarded in the decade ending in the 
academic year 2007–2008.48 
                                                                                                     
 41. BAUM & PAYEA, supra note 39, at 1 (noting that 62% of postsecondary 
students enrolled full-time). 
 42. NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, POSTSECONDARY INSTITUTIONS AND 
PRICE OF ATTENDANCE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2010–11; DEGREES AND OTHER 
AWARDS CONFERRED: 2009–10; AND 12–MONTH ENROLLMENT: 2009–10, at 14 tbl.6 
(2011) [hereinafter NCES, POSTSECONDARY INSTITUTIONS], http://nces.ed.gov/ 
pubs2011/2011250.pdf (counting enrollment by headcount, which means 
counting part-time students the same as those going to school full-time, and 
showing 3.3 million undergraduates and 431,000 graduate students at for-profit 
colleges in 2009–10); id. at 15 tbl.7 (counting full-time-equivalent enrollment 
and showing 2.3 million undergraduates and 246,000 graduate students at for-
profit institutions). 
 43. COLLEGE BOARD, TRENDS IN COLLEGE PRICING 7 (2011) [hereinafter 
TRENDS IN COLLEGE PRICING 2011], http://trends.collegeboard.org/downloads/ 
College_Pricing_2011.pdf. 
 44. See BAUM & PAYEA, supra note 39, at 1 (breaking down for-profit school 
enrollment in the fall of 2009 by program duration, full-time or part-time, and 
undergraduate students as compared to total number of students enrolled). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
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B. Aggressive Recruiting 
Recruiting by for-profit colleges has ranged from aggressive 
to deceptive and even fraudulent. In a 2010 study, investigators 
from the Government Accountability Office (GAO) posed as 
prospective students and registered to receive information on web 
sites; they quickly received numerous telephone calls, as many as 
twenty-four in the first twenty-four hours and 182 within a 
month.49 The GAO investigators also posed as in-person 
applicants and found that all fifteen for-profit schools they visited 
engaged in “deceptive or otherwise questionable statements,” 
such as misinformation about accreditation, questionable 
information about graduation rates, misrepresentations that 
students were guaranteed employment upon completion and at 
salaries that few could actually expect to garner, and deceptive 
information about the duration and cost of the colleges’ 
programs.50 Although some schools’ representatives gave 
accurate, helpful, and reasonable information, advising 
applicants of risks, the investigators encountered argumentative 
and scolding recruiters, marketing techniques that required 
applicants to enroll before getting information, and overall hard-
sell tactics.51 
The worst practices found by the GAO involved 
encouragement to falsify information on federal financial aid 
forms (four of the fifteen schools visited).52 Schools’ recruiters also 
attempted to lead applicants to believe that student loans would 
not be collected and aided them in cheating on application tests 
                                                                                                     
 49. GREGORY D. KUTZ, MANAGING DIR., FORENSICS AUDITS AND SPECIAL 
INVESTIGATIONS, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-948T, TESTIMONY 
BEFORE S. COMM. ON HEALTH, EDUC., LABOR, AND PENSIONS, FOR-PROFIT 
COLLEGES, UNDERCOVER TESTING FINDS COLLEGES ENCOURAGED FRAUD AND 
ENGAGED IN DECEPTIVE AND QUESTIONABLE MARKETING PRACTICES 3, 14–16 
(2010) (describing “flood of calls” to four fictitious prospective students who 
registered on websites). The for-profit college industry attacked this GAO study, 
leading to a reinvestigation and revision of the study; the revised results are 
discussed in the text above and in the report. Id. at 9, 8 tbl.1, 12, app. I at 19–
27. 
 50. Id. at 9–11. 
 51. Id. at 12–14. 
 52. Id. at 7–8, 12.  
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(by coaching or permitting extra time or a retest to get a higher 
score).53 
A practice that is prohibited by law is providing commissions 
or other incentive payments to recruiters based “directly or 
indirectly” on success in enrolling students.54 Despite the 
prohibition on incentive-based compensation, allegations have 
surfaced of continuance of the practice: for example, four states 
and the U.S. Department of Justice joined as intervenors in a 
whistleblower lawsuit against Education Management 
Corporation alleging continued used of incentive-based 
commissions.55 
C. High Net Price 
To compare tuition and fees of various sectors, one has to 
take into account the difference between published prices and 
what students pay after grant aid from all sources, public and 
private. The sticker price is not the price paid by most students, 
as will be detailed below. Although average published prices for 
tuition and fees are up across the board in recent years, inflation-
adjusted net prices actually declined in the five years from 2005–
2006 to 2010–2011 due to increases in federal and institutional 
grant aid.56 In 2011–2012, net prices were still down compared to 
those five years earlier at private nonprofit four-year and public 
two-year institutions, while they increased slightly at public four-
year schools, but much less than published prices.57 Only about a 
                                                                                                     
 53. Id. at 12. 
 54. 20 U.S.C. § 1094(a)(20) (2006). See Career College Assn. v. Duncan, 796 
F. Supp. 2d 108 (D. D.C. 2011) (upholding regulation barring incentive 
compensation to recruiters). 
 55. See Joint Complaint in Intervention by the United States of America, 
and the States of California, Florida, Illinois, and Indiana ¶¶ 1–11,United 
States ex rel. Washington v. Educ. Mgmt. Corp., Civ. No. 07-461 (W.D. Pa. 2011) 
(alleging violations of the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729, and Title IV of the 
Higher Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1094); U.S. Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Files 
Complaint Against Education Management Corp. Alleging False Claims Act 
Violations, JUST. NEWS, Aug. 8, 2011, http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/ 
August/11-civ-1026.html (providing background on Educ. Mgmt. Corp., Civ. No. 
07-461 (W.D. Pa. 2011)). 
 56. TRENDS IN COLLEGE PRICING 2010, supra note 40, at 4, 8. 
 57. TRENDS IN COLLEGE PRICING 2011, supra note 43, at 4 (noting that at 
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third of college students pay the full published prices at nonprofit 
and public institutions.58 
The average published tuition and fees for full-time 
undergraduates in 2011–2012, gathered by the College Board, 
were: 
Public two-year $2,963 
Public four-year (in state) $8,244 
Private for-profit $14,487 
Private nonprofit four-year $28,50059 
Again, these published prices are not the same as what students 
actually pay. Here is the College Board’s estimated net average 
payment for tuition and fees for 2011–12, once grant aid and 
federal tax credits and deductions are taken into account: 
Public two-year  ($810)60 
Public four-year (in state) $2,490 
Private for-profit $4,700 
Private nonprofit four-year $12,97061 
Students received on average the following estimated annual 
amounts in grant aid from all sources in 2011–2012: $3,770 at 
two-year public schools, $5,750 at public four-year colleges, and 
                                                                                                     
public four-year institutions in the period 2006–2007 to 2011–2012, inflation-
adjusted published prices increased by an average of 5.1% per year, while 
inflation-adjusted net prices at these schools increased on average by 1.4% a 
year). 
 58. Id. at 8; see also TRENDS IN COLLEGE PRICING 2010, supra note 40, at 3 
(indicating some of that third who do not receive grant aid receive federal tax 
credits and deductions that help to cover expenses); COLLEGE BOARD, TRENDS IN 
STUDENT AID 2011, supra note 4, at 21 (noting increase in tax savings in the 
form of education tax credits and deductions from $6.6 billion in 2008 to $14.7 
billion in 2009, both in 2009 dollars, and also noting that the income ceiling for 
the tax credit went up from $120,000 to $180,000 for joint filers).  
 59.  TRENDS IN COLLEGE PRICING 2011, supra note 43, at 3; see also id. at 7 
(noting that although the College Board provides information on for-profit 
colleges’ average published and net prices, these should be interpreted with 
caution because they are based on a small sample compared to the data on 
prices at public and nonprofit schools).  
 60. The figure is negative because grant aid and tax subsidies on average 
exceed tuition and fees; the excess can go to other expenses, such as books and 
room and board. 
 61. TRENDS IN COLLEGE PRICING 2011, supra note 43, at 15 fig. 7. 
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$15,530 at private nonprofit four-year schools.62 The College 
Board did not report an average amount of grant aid for students 
at for-profit schools, and it urges caution in interpreting its 
pricing information for these schools because of difficulty in 
obtaining data and the resulting small sample size.63 
Grant aid at for-profit schools has been lower on average 
because they do not offer much institutional grant aid.64 In 2007–
2008, for example, full-time undergraduate students at for-profit 
colleges received on average about $140 in institutional grant aid, 
compared to over $7,000 at private nonprofit colleges.65 Total 
grant aid from all sources for full-time dependent students at for-
profit schools averaged $3,610, with 75% of the grant aid being 
federal grants, compared to $7,050 in grants on average in 2007–
2008 at four-year public colleges, only 25% of it federal.66 It 
should be remembered that public universities typically have 
lower published and net tuition and fees to begin with than for-
profit institutions.67 At private nonprofit institutions in 2007–
2008, grant aid for fulltime dependent students ranged widely 
across the four quartiles of pricing, with average grants in each 
group, from lowest- to highest-priced schools, as follows: $7,700, 
$14,550, $17,620, $21,860.68 Overall, the average net price at 
either a two-year or a four-year public school was significantly 
lower than at a for-profit school, and even at private nonprofit 
colleges, the average net price is lower or only moderately higher 
in the lower two quartiles of pricing.69 Private nonprofit schools 
                                                                                                     
 62. Id. (noting that these figures are estimates based on prior years and 
available information but not full financial aid data). No figure was given for 
grant aid at for-profit schools. See supra note 59 (concerning difficulty of 
obtaining data). 
 63. Id. 
 64. BAUM & PAYEA, supra note 39, at 4 fig. 3 (showing that in 2007–2008, 
73% of grant aid at four-year nonprofit schools and 34% at four-year public 
schools came from institutional sources, while only 7% of grant aid at for-profit 
schools was from institutional sources). 
 65. Id. at 4 
 66. Id. at 4 fig. 3, tbl.4. 
 67. See supra notes 59–61 and accompanying text. 
 68. BAUM & PAYEA, supra note 39, at 4 tbl.4. 
 69. Id. (showing the following net average prices, including all expenses, in 
2007–2008: $6,480 for two-year public schools, $9,030 for public four-year 
schools in-state, $16,510 for for-profit institutions, and the following four 
average net prices, by pricing quartile, for private nonprofit schools: $12,030, 
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received only 9% of their grant aid from the federal government 
in 2007–2008.70 Even at nonprofit schools with the highest sticker 
price, need-based grant aid for low-income students often makes 
this a cheaper option, and one that comes with better outcomes 
for those qualified for admission.71 
D. Reliance on Federal Grant Aid and Student Loans 
A key feature of the for-profit college business model is 
maximum use of federal student aid, both grants and loans. “In 
2009, the five largest for-profit institutions received 77% of their 
revenues from federal student aid programs.”72 They are 
permitted to get up to 90% of revenue from Title IV, Higher 
Education Act funds.73 The rest can be taken from other federal 
                                                                                                     
$17,400, $20,570, and $24,140). 
 70. Id. at 4 fig. 3. 
 71. Some elite private nonprofit colleges have set family income levels 
below which students pay nothing for their education. At Yale University, for 
example, undergraduates from families with annual income under $65,000 pay 
nothing. See YALE, FINANCIAL AID, http://admissions.yale.edu/financial-aid 
(reporting, additionally, that 57% of undergraduates received need-based 
financial aid from the university). 
 72. Proposed Gainful Employment Rule Analysis, supra note 6, at 43,618; 
see also supra note 1 (explaining that the analysis throughout this Article does 
not include for-profit schools that are not reported in federal data because they 
do not participate in federal student aid programs). 
 73. 20 U.S.C. § 1094(a)(24) (2006). In a previous version of this percentage 
cap, instituted in 1992, schools could receive no more than 85% of their revenue 
from Higher Education Act Title IV funds. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 
GAO/HEHS-97-104, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, H.R. SUBCOMM. ON HUMAN RES., 
COMM. ON GOV’T REFORM AND OVERSIGHT, PROPRIETARY SCHOOLS: MILLIONS SPENT 
TO TRAIN STUDENTS FOR OVERSUPPLIED OCCUPATIONS 6 (1997) (discussing the 
“85-15” rule of the Higher Education Act). The 90/10 rule was put into effect by 
the 1998 HEA Amendments (Pub. L. No. 105-244), replacing its predecessor, the 
85/15 rule, which was authorized by the 1992 HEA Amendments (Pub. L. No. 
102-235). A further reduction of the 90/10 rule’s impact occurred under the 
Higher Education Opportunity Act of 2008, 122 Stat. 3078 (codified as amended 
at 20 U.S.C. § 1001–1161 (2006)), which changed the 90/10 rule from an 
institution eligibility test to a condition for program participation and allowed 
additional resources to be counted as institutional revenue. 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1094(a)(24) (2006). Institutions that do not comply with the rule are now 
allowed to continue participation in the federal aid programs for two years. 
Kathleen S. Tighe, Inspector Gen., Dep’t of Educ., Statement Before the S. 
Comm. on Health, Educ. Labor, and Pensions 4–5 (June 24, 2010), 
http://help.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Tighe.pdf. (explaining the operation of the 
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programs, such as those for veterans, or from private student 
loans,74 meaning that the schools do not necessarily have any 
skin in the game as far as outcomes for students. With the decline 
of availability of private student loans, for-profit schools have 
increased their institutional lending to their own students, and if 
institutional lending is combined with increased tuition, schools 
can pass the 90% test without reducing the amount of federal aid 
they receive.75 
The 11% of all full-time equivalent (FTE) postsecondary 
students enrolled in for-profit schools in 2008–2009 received 24% 
of federal Pell Grants.76  They also received 28% of the 
unsubsidized and 25% of the subsidized Stafford loans, compared 
to 6% and 8%, respectively, for the 27% of all FTE students at 
public two-year institutions.77 The federal funds going to for-
profit schools in 2009 amounted to “more than $4 billion in Pell 
grants and $20 billion in federal student loans.”78  
                                                                                                     
90/10 Rule and stating that the 2008 changes “made it easier for the institutions 
to meet the 90/10 Rule”). 
 74. See Proposed Gainful Employment Rule Analysis, supra note 6, at 
43,618 (noting that federal funds other than Title IV HEA funds can be counted 
toward the 10% minimum, including veterans’ education benefits and federal job 
training funds).  
 75. See supra note 5 (discussing for-profit schools responding to reduced 
private lending by making loans themselves); see also Eisman, Subprime Goes 
to College, Presentation at the Ira Sohn Conference, supra note 6, at slide 25 
(discussing raising tuition and forcing students to get non-federal aid to make 
up the difference as a way to pass the 90/10 rule). 
 76. BAUM & PAYEA, supra note 39, at 3 tbl.2. The College Board reported 
that the percentage of FTEs in the for-profit sector a year later, in 2009–2010, 
had risen to 12%, with 25% of Pell Grant dollars going to them, and since 
expenditures on Pell Grants rose from $18.1 billion in 2008–2009 to $30.4 billion 
in 2009–2010, that would put the total Pell Grant dollars going to for-profits in 
the latter year at $7.6 billion. TRENDS IN STUDENT AID 2011, supra note 4, at 
4,16, 22. 
 77. BAUM & PAYEA, supra note 39, at 3 tbl.2; COLLEGE BOARD, TRENDS IN 
STUDENT AID 4 (2010). 
 78. KUTZ, supra note 49, (in highlights, page prior to page 1). 
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E. Higher Debts and Higher Default Rates; Lower Graduation 
and Repayment Rates 
For-profit college students take out more loans than students 
in public or private nonprofit institutions and fail to repay at 
higher rates, despite the premise of career college education that 
its mission is to add income that will allow students to repay 
student loans.79 Among completers of bachelor’s programs in 
2007–2008, for example, the median student debt (on federal and 
non-federal loans) of for-profit college graduates (including 
nonborrowers) was $31,157, compared to $16,175 at private 
nonprofit schools and $6,998 for public institutions.80 For 
completers of two-year associate’s degree programs the same 
year, the disparity was particularly pronounced, with the median 
debt being zero at public schools, while it was $18,415 at for-
profit schools and $10,000 at private nonprofit institutions.81 The 
zero debt median at public two-year programs is due to the very 
low tuition at many community colleges, so that students can 
often pay as they go from income and grants. By comparison, 
tuition at two-year for-profit programs is typically nearly as 
expensive per year as at four-year for-profit programs.82 The GAO 
investigation discussed above noted that a comparison of nearby 
for-profit and public two-year programs reveals instances of for-
profit programs that are six to thirteen times more expensive.83 
Another useful comparison is the percentage of students in the 
various sectors who receive bachelor’s degrees who are more than 
$30,000 in debt; in 2007–2008, the figure was 57% of for-profit 
four-year degree recipients, while it was 25% at private nonprofit 
schools and 13% at public schools.84 Only 4% of bachelor’s degree 
                                                                                                     
 79. See Proposed Gainful Employment Rule Analysis, supra note 6, at 
43657 (discussing industry spokesman’s argument that “the students receiving 
loans will, in almost every case, be enabled to repay them out of the added 
income”). 
 80. Id. at 43,647 tbl.A-1. 
 81. Id. 
 82. NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS 
tbl.347 (2010), http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d10/tables/dt10_347.asp 
(showing median tuition and fees for 2009–2010 at for-profit schools of $14,212 
for four-year schools and $13,548 for two-year schools). 
 83. KUTZ, supra note 49, at 17. 
 84. See Proposed Gainful Employment Rule Analysis, supra note 6, at 
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recipients at for-profit colleges had no debt that year, while the 
debt-free figure was 38% at public universities and 28% at 
private nonprofits.85 At the associate degree level in 2007–2008, 
only 5% of public college graduates had debt of $20,000 or more, 
while 42% of for-profit graduates had debt that high;86 of public 
two-year graduates that year, 62% had no debt, compared to only 
2% with no debt among private for-profit associate degree 
graduates.87  
Former students of for-profit colleges also have high default 
and low repayment rates, in part driven by low graduation 
rates.88 Avoiding default is not the same as repaying. Many 
students become delinquent without being counted as defaulting, 
and others get deferments and forbearances, which also are not 
counted as defaults. A study of student-loan borrowers in all 
higher education sectors who entered repayment in 2005 found 
that over the next five years, 37% repaid on time, 23% postponed 
repayment by deferment or forbearance and thus avoided default, 
26% were delinquent without being counted as in default, and 
15% defaulted, under program definitions that generally do not 
count a delinquency as a default for at least 270 days.89 In sum, 
                                                                                                     
43,650. The College Board reported similar figures a year later: among 
dependent four-year degree completers in 2009, nearly two-thirds of those who 
graduated from for-profit schools had debt of $28,000 or more, while the same 
statistic was 14% at public schools and 25% at private nonprofit schools. TRENDS 
IN STUDENT AID 2011, supra note 4, at 18 fig. 9A. Furthermore, the differences in 
completion rates were striking: 64% of students at public four-year schools and 
71% at private nonprofits, but only 15% of students at for-profit schools (for 
2003–2004 beginning postsecondary dependent students who last attended a 
four-year institution and who received a bachelor’s degree by 2009). Id. at 18. 
 85. TRENDS IN FOR-PROFIT POSTSECONDARY EDUCATION, supra note 39, at 5 
& Table 6. 
 86. Proposed Gainful Employment Rule Analysis, supra note 6, at 43,650. 
 87. TRENDS IN FOR-PROFIT POSTSECONDARY EDUCATION, supra note 39, at 5 
& tbl.6. 
 88. See Proposed Gainful Employment Rule Analysis, supra note 6, at 
43,654 (concerning low relative completion rates for students at four-year for-
profit schools compared to the other sectors’ four-year schools). 
 89. See Alisa F. Cunningham & Gregory S. Kienzl, Delinquency: The 
Untold Story of Student Loan Borrowing, INST. FOR HIGHER EDUC. POL’Y, Mar. 
2011, at 4–6, 8 (summarizing results concerning payment on time, deferment 
and forbearance, delinquency, and default for debtors who entered repayment in 
2005 and were followed for five years while also noting that student-loan 
debtors are not generally considered in default until 270 days to 360 days of 
delinquency). 
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looking at all sectors together, the debtors who went into default 
or delinquency exceeded those who paid on time, not counting 
those who got deferments or forbearances. 
When these figures are broken down by higher education 
sector, differences are dramatic in a comparison of those who 
attended four-year for-profits as opposed to four-year nonprofit 
and public institutions. Combined delinquencies and defaults 
after five years for those who entered repayment in 2005 were as 
follows: private nonprofits (28% total, broken down 20% 
delinquent/8% in default), public (34% total, broken down 24% 
delinquent/10% in default); and for-profit (53% total, broken 
down 29% delinquent/24% in default).90 The figures are closer in 
a comparison of two-year institutions, with combined 
delinquencies and defaults of: public (60% total, broken down 
36% delinquent/24% in default) and for-profit (63% total, broken 
down 27% delinquent/36% in default).91 There is generally less 
delinquency and default among borrowers who complete degrees 
as opposed to those who do not,92 and students at for-profit four-
year programs leave within three years without enrolling 
elsewhere at more than three times the rate of students at public 
and private nonprofit four-year programs.93 While students at 
public two-year schools leave without a degree at a higher rate 
than students at for-profit two-year schools,94 most two-year 
public school students do not have to incur student-loan debt.95 
Each fiscal year, the government has published official 
national student loan two-year “cohort default rates,”96 which 
                                                                                                     
 90. Id. at 23. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 24 (showing, for example, 35% total delinquency and default for 
graduates of for-profit schools, compared to a 64% for those who left without a 
degree). 
 93. Proposed Gainful Employment Rule Analysis, supra note 6, at 43,655 
tbl. C (showing 34% rate for-profits, 10.8% for publics, and 10.0% rate for 
private nonprofits of leaving four-year schools within three years without 
enrolling elsewhere); see also supra note 84 (concerning five-year graduation 
rates of students at four-year schools in all three sectors). 
 94. Id. Proposed Gainful Employment Rule Analysis, supra note 6, at 
43,655 (showing that 34.1% of students at public two-year program leave within 
three years without a degree and without enrolling elsewhere, compared to 
26.6% of students in for-profit two-year programs). 
 95. See supra notes 81, 87 and accompanying text. 
 96. See Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Education, Default Rates Rise for 
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have risen in recent years for all sectors. From fiscal year 2008 to 
fiscal year 2009, the overall cohort default rate, published by the 
government in September 2011, rose from 7% to 8.8%. In the for-
profit sector, the increase was from 11.6% to 15%.97 These figures 
are primarily useful for showing trends and comparing sectors 
because, as discussed above, they are based on program 
definitions of default that exclude delinquencies, deferments, and 
forbearances, and they count only defaults on loans that came 
due in one fiscal year and defaulted by the end of the next fiscal 
year, but not defaults that occur later.98 
Other measures better capture the risk of attending for-profit 
institutions. For every 100 students who completed a program at 
a public or nonprofit school in 2007–2008, there were four former 
students who entered repayment in 2008 and defaulted the next 
year, while at for-profit institutions, there were 18 defaulters per 
100 completers, that is, more than four times as many defaulters 
as in the other sectors.99 When only four-year programs are 
considered, the defaulters to completers ratio was 25 per 100.100 
Another measure is how many borrowers are repaying any 
principal on their loans within three years after leaving school: 
the figures for fiscal years 2006 through 2009 were 80% of 
borrowers who attended public schools, 88% who attended 
nonprofit institutions, and only 55% in the case of career 
colleges.101 Looking at the same period and applying a test of 
percentage of institutions in the sector that had at least a 35% 
repayment rate, the figures were 89% for four-year public and 
nonprofit institutions, 73% for public two-year institutions, and 
less than 60% for all for-profit schools.102 The 35% repayment 
                                                                                                     
Federal Student Loans (Sept. 12, 2011), available at http://www.ed.gov/ 
news/press-releases/default-rates-rise-federal-student-loans (noting that official 
FY 2009 national student loan cohort default rate is a snapshot of the borrowers 
whose repayments came due between Oct. 1, 2008, and Sept. 30, 2009, 
indicating the percentage that defaulted before Sept. 30, 2010, and not including 
defaults after that time). 
 97. Id. 
 98. Supra notes 89, 96 and accompanying text. 
 99. Proposed Gainful Employment Rule Analysis, supra note 6, at 43,652. 
 100. Id. at 43,653–54 (noting that this default to completion ratio indicates 
“substantial barriers to providing value to enrollees”). 
 101. Id. at 43,654. 
 102. Id. 
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measure has been given a central role in the new gainful 
employment regulation,103 discussed in Part III.B below. 
F. Less Spending on Instruction 
For-profit colleges spend the least on instruction in dollars 
and percentage of overall expenditures.104 The disparity is 
greatest among four-year institutions, with about 21% of all 
expenditures by for-profit schools used for instruction, compared 
to 25% at public schools and 33% at nonprofits in 2008–2009.105 
The expenditures per FTE student at four-year schools in that 
year, total and for instruction (in parentheses), were as follows in 
the various sectors: $12,654 ($2,633) at for-profit colleges, 
$36,707 ($7,462) at public schools, and $46,080 ($15,143) at 
nonprofits.106 While they spent less on instruction, for-profit four-
year schools spent more on categories that include executive 
salaries and investor returns, the latter being something public 
and nonprofit schools do not have to fund.107 For-profit schools 
also increased their expenditures on lobbying as the DOE 
considered new regulation; whether or not as a result, the 
proposed regulation was watered down.108 
                                                                                                     
 103. See Gainful Employment Rule, supra note 10. 
 104. Table 378, National Center for Education Statistics, 2010 Tables and 
Figures (Nov. 2010) http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d10/tables/dt10_378.asp. 
The table shows that in 2008–2009, for-profit degree-granting schools spent 
23.66% of all expenditures on instruction, 20.81% at four-year schools and 
32.56% at two-year schools; per FTE student, they spent $12,654 total and 
$2,633 on instruction at four-year schools and $13,498 total and $4,394 on 
instruction at two-year schools. Id. 
 105. Id. at tbls.373, 375. 
 106. Id.  
 107. Id. (showing that at four-year institutions in 2008–2009, public schools 
spent about 18% of total expenditures on academic support, student services, 
and institutional support, while nonprofits spent about 26% and for-profits 
spent about 71%); see also Nancy Lewis, For-Profit Enrollment Grew 50-Fold 
from 1980–2009, YOUTH TODAY (May 26, 2011), http://www.youthtoday.org/ 
view_article.cfm?article_id=4805  (quoting an NCES commissioner on the point 
that the support categories include executive compensation and returns to 
shareholders).  
 108. Eric Lichtblau, With Lobbying Blitz, Profit-Making Colleges Diluted 
New Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2011, at A1 (describing how the industry’s 
“ferocious response” produced a “much weakened final plan”); Paul Blumenthal, 
Regulations Lead to Lobbying Surge by the For-Profit College Industry, 
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G. Recent Declining Enrollment 
For-profit colleges have been reporting declining enrollments 
since late 2010.109 This seems to be due to a combination of 
decreased interest by prospective students but also reduced 
recruiting by this sector as it attempts to ride out negative 
publicity, increased attention by regulators and other public 
officials, and the bad economy.110 
III. The Weak Regulatory Framework and Lack of Relief 
for Debtors 
A. History of Federal Support for For-Profit Institutions 
The Higher Education Act of 1965 (HEA) established the 
Guaranteed Student Loan Program.111 Originally, only students 
                                                                                                     
SUNLIGHT FOUNDATION BLOG (Mar. 10, 2011, 11:45 AM), http://sunlight 
foundation.com/blog/2011/03/10/regulations-lead-to-lobbying-surge-by-the-for-profit-
college-industry/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2012) (reporting tripling of lobbying 
expenditures from 2009 to 2010) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); 
Bennett Roth, For-Profit Colleges Field Team of Top Lobbyists, ROLLCALL (May 2, 
2011), http://www.rollcall.com/issues/56_114/-205206-1.html (last visited Apr. 10, 
2012) (concerning hiring of many top lobbyists to stop or roll back the proposed 
Gainful Employment Rule) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 109. See Korn, supra note 14 (discussing declines in enrollments of up to 
45% because of industry decisions to reduce aggressive recruiting and in 
addition due to student resistance to debt and risk); Rachel Wiseman, 
Enrollments Plunge at Many For-Profit Colleges, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Sept. 
2, 2011, at A33. 
 110. Alan Scher Zagier, Tracking Trends: For-Profit Colleges Respond to 
Increased Scrutiny, COMMUNITY COLLEGE WEEK, (Aug. 22, 2011), 
http://www.ccweek.com/news/templates/template.aspx?articleid=2688&zoneid=3 
(last visited Apr. 10, 2012) (discussing declining enrollment and revenue at for-
profit colleges, at least partly by industry design because of increased regulatory 
scrutiny) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Robert 
Schroeder, Lobbying Up, Earnings Down at For-Profit Colleges, MARKET WATCH 
(Oct. 27, 2011, 10:54 AM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/lobbying-up-
earnings-down-at-for-profit-schools-2011-10-27 (last visited Apr. 10, 2012) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also supra Part II.B and 
infra Part III. 
 111. Higher Education Act, Pub. L. No. 89-329, 79 Stat. 1219 (1965) (codified 
at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq. (2006)). The Student Aid and Fiscal Responsibility 
Act of 2009, signed into law in 2010 as part of the Health Care and Education 
Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, eliminated future federally 
guaranteed student loans and replaced them with direct federal student loans 
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at public and nonprofit schools were eligible to receive Title IV 
HEA funds.112 Proprietary school students became eligible for this 
federal aid in 1972.113 Changes in 1979 made private student-loan 
lenders more willing to lend to students at for-profit schools by 
removing a federal interest subsidy limit and thus encouraging 
lenders to take the risk.114 As a result, proprietary schools grew, 
fueled by revenue from federal student grant and loan funds, and 
by the late 1980s they had become the focus of congressional 
oversight attention and class action litigation alleging that these 
schools were aggressively recruiting the poor and the homeless 
from welfare lines and laundromats and using help-wanted ads 
promising better jobs to get students to enroll.115 As today, the 
risk of default on student loans was compared to a recent 
financial meltdown; in the earlier era, it was the savings and loan 
crisis,116 and today, it is the mortgage crisis.117 In other words, we 
have been here before in witnessing the burgeoning of a for-profit 
higher education sector that focused more on harvesting federal 
student aid dollars than on delivering results to students.118  
                                                                                                     
starting July 1, 2010. See Student Aid and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2009; 
FINAID, http://www.finaid.org/educators/20090715hr3221.phtml (last visited 
Apr. 10, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also supra 
note 4. 
 112. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-97-104, supra note 73, at 5. 
 113. Id.; see also Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 
Stat. 235, 375. 
 114. Nicholas R. Johnson, Phoenix Rising: Default Rates at Proprietary 
Institutions of Higher Education and What Can Be Done to Reduce Them, 40 
J.L. & EDUC. 225, 229 (2011); see also Armstrong v. Accrediting Council for 
Continuing Educ. & Training, Inc., 168 F.3d 1362, 1364 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (noting 
amendments to the Higher Education Act). 
 115. Cathy Lesser Mansfield, The Federal Trade Commission Holder Rule 
and Its Applicability to Student Loans—Reallocating the Risk of Proprietary 
School Failure, 26 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 635, 636–38 (1991) (describing 
aggressive and deceptive recruiting and failure to follow through on promises of 
a better life to the economically vulnerable and citing congressional oversight 
hearings and complaints in class action litigation).  
 116. Id. at 639. 
 117. See Proposed Gainful Employment Rule Analysis, supra note 6; infra 
Part IV.A. 
 118. Hearing on Waste, Fraud and Abuse in the For-Profit Education 
Section Before the Sen. Comm. On Health, Education, Labor & Pensions 1 
(2010) (statement of Margaret Reiter, former supervising deputy attorney 
general in the Consumer Law Section of the California Attorney General’s 
Office) (“By the mid 1990’s, I thought, naively it turns out, that we had turned 
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The problems with proprietary schools in the 1980s led to 
new regulation using cohort default rates (CDR).119 Effective in 
1991, schools were barred from receiving federal student aid 
funds if their CDR met or exceeded a 25% rate for three 
consecutive years.120  The CDR is a snapshot measure, until 
recently based on the number of students who entered student 
loan repayment in one fiscal year who had defaulted by the end of 
the next school year.121 Large numbers of the earlier for-profit 
schools were put out of business by the withdrawal of federal 
student aid dollars in the 1990s due to failure to meet the CDR 
limit for three years.122 The for-profit schools in that earlier era 
were largely small and thus local and often focused on nondegree 
training for a trade, albeit with poor results.123 
As trade schools closed down in the 1990s, the for-profit 
sector morphed into its current form. The new for-profit sector is 
characterized by large institutions offering conventional college 
degrees and organized as publicly traded companies,124 with ever-
                                                                                                     
the corner on fraud and abuse in the proprietary school industry.”). 
 119. Student Loan Default Prevention Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 
Stat. 1388 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et. seq.). 
 120. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-99-135, STUDENT LOANS: 
DEFAULT RATES NEED TO BE COMPUTED MORE APPROPRIATELY 4 (July 1999) 
(noting context of study focusing on depressive effect on the CDR of excluding 
students placed into deferment or forebearance). 
 121. Id. at 5. In 2008, Congress increased the three-year maximum default 
rate from 25% to 30%, effective in 2011. Higher Education Opportunity Act, 
Pub. L. No. 110-313, § 436(a)(1) (2008). It also changed from a two-year to a 
three-year cohort default rate. Id. § 436(e); see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFFICE, GAO-09-600, supra note 9, at 13. 
 122. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-600, supra note 9 at 11 
(stating that from 1991 to 1999, 1,580 proprietary schools and 1,846 schools 
total were subject to sanctions based on their default rates).  
 123. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-97-104, supra note 73, at 5 
(noting in 1997 that “[m]ost proprietary schools are small, enrolling fewer than 
100 students, and offer occupational training lasting 2 years or less”). 
 124. See HARKIN, EMERGING RISK?, supra note 19, at 2 (noting concentration 
of growth in enrollment at for-profit schools at those run by 14 publicly-traded 
companies); see also supra Part II.A (concerning move into degree-granting 
programs, particularly bachelor’s degrees); James Coleman & Richard Vedder, 
For-Profit Education in the United States: A Primer, CENTER FOR COLLEGE 
AFFORDABILITY AND PRODUCTIVITY, May 2008, at 21, available at http://www. 
policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/20592.pdf. (showing initial public 
offerings by eight of the largest for-profit college companies between 1988 and 
2003, with six occurring in the 1990s). 
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increasing sophistication in rent-seeking and regulatory 
evasion.125 CDR regulation has proven insufficient to shut down 
the worst current performers. Not only does the CDR use a short 
time horizon, although recently extended from two to three 
years,126 but it is also subject to manipulation because it excludes 
students who are in deferment or forbearance, which schools can 
help their students to pursue in the short term to keep CDR 
down.127 Only recently has DOE focused on positive repayment as 
a test for eligibility for federal student aid funds, as will be 
discussed next.  
B. New Gainful Employment Rule 
On June 13, 2011, DOE published its final Gainful 
Employment Rule (GER), culminating a two-year regulatory 
process.128 DOE published a proposed rule on July 26, 2010,129 
and it then received 90,000 comments, 75% of them negative.130 
                                                                                                     
 125. See Blumenthal, supra note 108 (concerning tripling in lobbying 
expenditures from 2008 to 2009); see also Eisman, supra note 6, at 25–26 of 
PowerPoint presentation (concerning manipulations of cohort default rates, 
discussed supra at notes 119–20 and accompanying text and infra at notes 126–
27 and accompanying text, and of 90/10 rule, discussed supra at notes 73–75 
and accompanying text). 
 126. See supra note 121. 
 127. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-99-135, supra note 120, at 
3–8, 10–12 (reporting doubling of the rate of deferment and forbearance from 
1993 to 1996 and examining the problem of CDR methodology allowing 
manipulation but finding in 1999 that proprietary schools were not doing so 
disproportionately and in fact had lower deferment and forbearance rates than 
other schools); Proposed Gainful Employment Rule Analysis, supra note 6, at 
43651 (discussing how some colleges work hard to keep their default rates down 
by assisting former students to use deferment and forbearance options). 
 128. Gainful Employment Rule Analysis, supra note 11, at 34388; Office of 
Postsecondary Education; Notice of Negotiated Rulemaking for Programs 
Authorized Under Title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965, as Amended, 74 
Fed. Reg. 46399 (Sep. 9, 2009) (announcing the beginning of the process). 
 129. Proposed Gainful Employment Rule Analysis, supra note 6, at 43,616. 
 130. Gainful Employment Rule Analysis, supra note 11, at 34390 (noting 
that in addition to giving the figures in the text, the DOE stated that many 
comments were not specific, stated only general opposition or support for the 
proposed rule, appeared generated by petition drives and letter-writing 
campaigns, and expressed general support for making sure that student loans 
are affordable). 
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Meanwhile, many members of Congress, prompted by heavy 
industry lobbying, also opposed the rule and sought to deny DOE 
funds to implement it.131 Given this backdrop, it is perhaps 
surprising that any rule was promulgated, but DOE pressed on, 
simplifying the rule, reducing its requirements, and setting an 
effective date of July 1, 2012,132 but with no program ineligibility 
as a consequence prior to 2015.133 A leading for-profit industry 
trade association, however, brought suit on July 20, 2011, to 
block the GER, arguing inter alia that DOE lacks authority to 
make the rule.134 DOE addressed its authority to issue the rule in 
its final regulatory analysis, relying on the section of the HEA 
that defines an eligible program to include one that provides 
“training to prepare students for gainful employment in a 
recognized profession.”135 DOE also pointed to broad 
congressional delegations of administrative power, under which 
the Secretary of Education “is authorized to prescribe such rules 
and regulations as the Secretary determines necessary or 
appropriate to administer and manage the functions of the 
Secretary or the Department,”136 and may “make, promulgate, 
                                                                                                     
 131. See Complaint and Prayer for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra 
note 6, ¶ 12 (stating that “289 Members of the House of Representatives—231 
Republicans and 58 Democrats—voted in February 2011 to deny the 
Department [of Education] any funds to implement the Gainful Employment 
regulations” (citation omitted)); see also supra note 108 (concerning heavy 
lobbying by the industry). 
 132. Gainful Employment Rule Analysis, supra note 11, at 34386. 
 133. Mark Kantrowitz, Summary and Analysis of Gainful Employment 
Final Rule, FINAID.ORG (June 2, 2011), available at http://www.finaid.org/ 
educators/20110602gainfulemployment.pdf (noting that given use of tests that 
require failing three out of four years, there will be no immediate loss of 
eligibility and that 2015 is the earliest that a program could lose eligibility). 
 134. Complaint and Prayer for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 
6, at 54 (seeking declaratory and injunctive relief), ¶ 5 (arguing that the 
regulatory tests “are beyond the Department’s statutory authority” in light of 
detailed statutory requirements concerning maximum student debt levels and 
loan default rates).  
 135. 20 U.S.C. § 1002(b)(1)(A) (2006); see also Gainful Employment Rule 
Analysis, supra note 11, at 34392. The phrase “gainful employment” is also 
found in 20 U.S.C. §§ 1001, 1088 (2006). 
 136. 20 U.S.C. § 3474 (2006); see also Gainful Employment Rule Analysis, 
supra note 11, at 34392. 
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issue, rescind, and amend rules and regulations” for DOE 
programs, including the federal student aid programs.137 
As finally promulgated, the GER sets up two tests, and only 
if a program fails both of these tests for three out of four years 
does it lose eligibility to receive Title IV Higher Education Act 
(HEA) student aid funds, which include both federal grants and 
federal student loans.138 The first test concerns the repayment 
rate of former students, and the second focuses on the debt-to-
income (DTI) ratios of completers of programs.139  
The student loan repayment rate of a program is not the 
same as the rate of former students not in default. This is 
because default is defined narrowly as not meeting DOE 
requirements: those not counted as in default include former 
students who get deferments and forbearances, and also those 
who are delinquent but not yet in default (defined as up to a year 
of delinquency).140 Under the repayment test, schools will remain 
eligible to receive federal student aid if 35% of their former 
students are repaying at least some principal on their loans (even 
$1).141 This is a reduction from the proposed rule, which set 45% 
repayment as the threshold for no consequences, with a restricted 
eligibility category below that.142 The final rule adopted a 
simplified approach, in that it eliminated the use of two tiers, 
with a restricted category and enhanced disclosure requirements 
between 35% and 45% repayment; the final rule sets 35% as the 
sole repayment test and places no restrictions on those passing 
this test or one of the alternative DTI ratios, discussed below.143 
Even below 35% repayment (as well as missing the DTI ratios), a 
program suffers only enhanced disclosure requirements by 
missing for a year or two.144 The formula for the 35% repayment 
test has some additional leeway built in. Schools can choose 
                                                                                                     
 137. 20 U.S.C. § 1221e-3 (2006); see also Gainful Employment Rule Analysis, 
supra note 11, at 34392. 
 138. Gainful Employment Rule Analysis, supra note 11, at 34388. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at 34408–10 (discussing who is counted as repaying). 
 141. Gainful Employment Rule, supra note 10 (setting up a complex formula 
to make this calculation). 
 142. See Gainful Employment Rule Analysis, supra note 11, at 34393–95. 
 143. Id. at 34395, 34400; see also supra note10. 
 144. 34 C.F.R. § 668.7(j) (2011). 
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between two-year and four-year repayment periods,145 and they 
can also include as repaying former students who are not paying 
principal but are in a public-service repayment program146 and up 
to 3% of students making income-contingent or income-based 
repayment.147 Some loans are excluded entirely from the 
formula—those loans in deferment because the students are 
continuing their educations or are in the military and also those 
of students who have died or who have been discharged by the 
Secretary of Education for total and permanent disability or are 
under consideration for that type of discharge.148 
Alternatively, a program can remain eligible under either 
part of a two-pronged DTI test. The typical annual student loan 
payment, including private student loans, of completers of 
programs must be 12% or less of annual earnings or 30% or less 
of discretionary income; programs may choose either mean or 
median figures using either test.149  The inclusion of only 
completers of programs is obviously quite forgiving to the for-
profit industry, given their high noncompletion rates.150 The final 
rule kept the DTI ratios of the proposed rule, which had already 
been increased by 50% each from research-based and industry-
used standards, thus providing leeway to withstand various 
criticisms of these standards.151 DOE described these DTI ratios 
                                                                                                     
 145. Id. § 668.7(a)(2)(iv)–(v), (b)(1)(ii) (2011). 
 146. Id. § 668.7(b)(3)(B) (2011). 
 147. Id. § 668.7(b)(3)(C) (2011). 
 148. Id. § 668.7(b)(4) (2011). 
 149. Id. § 668.7(c)(2) (2011) (concerning inclusion only of program 
completers); id. § 668.7(c)(3) (using either median or mean for both the annual 
loan payment and income figures). The repayment rate test does not include 
private student loans, but the DTI ratios do. 34 C.F.R. § 668.7(b)(1), (c)(4)(i) 
(2011). 
 150. See supra notes 84, 92–93 and accompanying text (discussing much 
lower completion rate at for-profit schools and association generally of non-
completion with higher rates of delinquency and default on student loans). 
 151. Proposed Gainful Employment Rule Analysis, supra note 6, at 43620. 
The proposed rule discusses how DOE started with a DTI ratio of 20% of 
discretionary income, based on the research of economists Sandy Baum and 
Saul Schwarz about the outer boundaries of manageable student debt, and then 
added an alternative standard from industry underwriting based on 8% of 
annual earnings, before in addition increasing each of these by 50% to the 
30%/12% DTI tests. Id.; see also Gainful Employment Rule Analysis, supra note 
11, at 34394–95 (noting reliance on Sandy Baum and Saul Schwartz, How Much 
Debt is Too Much? Defining Benchmarks for Manageable Student Debt, a 2006 
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as establishing “thresholds above which it becomes unambiguous 
that a program’s debt levels are excessive.”152 
A particularly controversial aspect of the DTI tests is that 
they depend on harvesting actual income of school’s graduates 
from Social Security Administration (SSA) or other federal 
data.153 Schools are permitted to correct the students on the 
list,154 but the for-profit industry objected that schools may not 
challenge the annual earnings figures obtained from the SSA (a 
restriction based on privacy concerns about revealing former 
students’ income) and argued that the lack of a meaningful 
opportunity to contest this data violates constitutional due 
process standards.155 
A program loses eligibility to receive HEA student aid grants 
and loans only if it does not pass the repayment test or a DTI test 
for three out of four years, which means that passing either type 
of test in two out of four years is sufficient.156 Furthermore, 
DOE’s final rule includes a transition year in which there will be 
limited impact on program eligibility; the maximum ineligibility 
based on debt measures for the three fiscal years 2012, 2013, and 
2014 is for programs with a combined total of students not 
exceeding 5% of the students completing programs in 2014 in 
that category of institution.157 Beyond that transitional year (with 
the first year of ineligibility occurring in 2015),158 DOE estimated 
based on historical data that the 35% repayment rate identifies 
                                                                                                     
study for the College Board).  
 152. Proposed Gainful Employment Rule Analysis, supra note 6, at 43620. 
 153. 34 C.F.R. § 668.7(c)(3) (2011). 
 154. Id. § 668.7(e) (2011). 
 155. Complaint and Prayer for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 
6, ¶¶ 9, 61, & 114; see also 34 C.F.R. § 668.7(e)(1)(iv) (2011). DOE has responded 
by permitting institutions to do their own surveys, which must meet National 
Center for Education Statistics standards, if they fail the DTI ratios using SSA 
data. See Gainful Employment Rule Analysis, supra note 11, at 34428; 34 C.F.R. 
§ 668.7(g)(3) (2011).  
 156. See supra notes 138, 143–44 and accompanying text. 
 157. 34 C.F.R. § 668.7(k) (2011); see also id. § 668.7(a)(2)(i)(A) (incorporating 
definition of 34 C.F.R. § 668.8(c)(3), so that the rule also applies to certain 
certificate programs of schools in other categories than for-profit); Gainful 
Employment Rule Analysis, supra note 11, at 34386 (concerning applicability to 
certificate programs of public and nonprofit schools).  
 158. See Kantrowitz, supra note 133. 
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approximately the lowest-performing quarter of programs subject 
to the GER.159 As a projection, this assumes that schools would 
not improve performance at all in response to the new rule. In 
addition, even without improvement, some of the bottom quarter 
of programs would still remain eligible, given that programs only 
need to pass the 35% repayment rate for three out of four years or 
alternatively pass a DTI test. DOE aimed only to identify “the 
poorest performing programs” and to set “minimum standards” 
that “provide flexibility, specifically allowing programs an 
opportunity to improve their performance” before losing 
eligibility.160 
Even after losing eligibility, programs may be able to regain 
it. The GER provides that an ineligible program may reestablish 
eligibility after the end of the third fiscal year following the fiscal 
year in which it lost it.161 Showing that the DOE anticipates 
attempts at evasion of sanctions, ineligibility extends not only to 
a program but to another program of the same institution that is 
“substantially similar to the ineligible program” in part based on 
offering “the same credential level.”162 
DOE has multiple public policy goals. While recognizing the 
need for a “healthy and productive” for-profit sector to increase 
the education level of the population, it was also concerned about 
devaluation and oversupply of credentials, with resulting labor 
oversupplies leading to unemployment or decline in wages and 
inability of graduates to support themselves and their families 
while also repaying student loans.163 In addition, DOE articulated 
goals of protecting taxpayers and students.164 The agency noted 
that standards are needed to “protect taxpayers against wasteful 
spending on educational programs of little or no value that also 
                                                                                                     
 159. Gainful Employment Rule Analysis, supra note 11, at 34395–96 (noting 
that under the final rule’s definition of the 35% repayment rate, about 26% of 
programs across all sectors, public, nonprofit, and for-profit, would not meet 
that test). Only certain certificate programs at public and nonprofit schools are 
subject to GER. See supra note 157. 
 160. Id. at 34388. 
 161. 34 C.F.R. § 668.7(l)(2)(ii) (2011).  
 162. Id. 
 163. Proposed Gainful Employment Rule Analysis, supra note 6, at 43617. 
 164. Id. at 43618. 
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lead to high indebtedness for students.”165 Another concern was 
that the stigma of default by former students from disadvantaged 
neighborhoods sends “an unfortunate message to others—that 
seeking an education can have disastrous results.”166 
Focusing particularly on students and their need for 
protection, the agency noted that they “often lack the necessary 
information to evaluate their postsecondary education options” 
and may be misled or manipulated by “skillful marketing, 
resulting in significant student loan debts without meaningful 
career opportunities” and “false information or assurances 
regarding future employment prospects and program costs.”167 
DOE thus identifies market failures based on asymmetries in 
information and sophistication as well as industry use of framing 
strategies in recruitment.  
Students who take on high-risk student-loan debt and lose 
the gamble face dire consequences. DOE summarized as follows: 
Former students who default on Federal loans cannot receive 
additional title IV aid for postsecondary education. Their 
credit rating is destroyed, undermining their ability to rent a 
house, get a mortgage, or purchase a car. To the extent they 
can get credit, they pay much higher interest. In some States, 
they may be denied certain occupational licenses. And, 
increasingly, employers consider credit record in their hiring 
decisions.168  
The agency also distinguished public and private nonprofit 
education on the grounds that “for-profit institutions are legally 
obligated to make profitability for shareholders the overriding 
objective.”169 The for-profit institutions thus are driven to 
maximize revenue from federal education programs, leading to 
the need for regulatory checks in light of the weak market 
policing provided by student choices that are too frequently 
uninformed, naïve, or the result of manipulation. In sum, DOE 
has a strong set of public policy rationales for its minimalist new 
                                                                                                     
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at 43622. 
 167. Id. at 43618, 43622. 
 168. Id. at 43622. 
 169. Id. This is true in the sense that officers of for-profit institutions have 
fiduciary obligations to maximize shareholder returns within the bounds of the 
law. 
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regulation, including consumer protection and wise use of 
taxpayer dollars. 
C. Lack of Sufficient Debt Relief in Bankruptcy or Otherwise 
The minimum standards approach to federal regulation of 
for-profit schools stands in stark contrast to the very tough 
approach of bankruptcy law toward student-loan debtors who 
cannot afford to repay. Career colleges complain that they are 
being held to standards that are too high,170 yet their students 
shoulder student loans that are nondischargeable in bankruptcy, 
absent “undue hardship on the debtor and the debtor’s 
dependents.”171 Under the prevailing judicial interpretation of 
what “undue hardship” means, there is a rigorous three-part test: 
the debtor is unable to support a “minimal” standard of living for 
the debtor and the debtor’s dependents if required to repay 
student loans, this state of affairs is likely to persist for a 
significant part of the student debt repayment period, and the 
debtor must have made good faith efforts to repay the student 
debt.172 The debtor bears the burden of proof by a preponderance 
of the evidence on each of these tests, and otherwise the debt is 
nondischargeable.173 To challenge nondischargeability, a student-
loan debtor must bring an adversary proceeding in bankruptcy, 
essentially a lawsuit within the umbrella of the bankruptcy case 
and thus an expensive venture, dependent as it is on elaborate 
factual proof that many debtors, particularly some of the worst 
off, have no hope of funding.174  
                                                                                                     
 170. Complaint and Prayer for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 
6.  
 171. 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(8), 1328(a)(2) (2006). 
 172. Brunner v. New York State Higher Educ. Serv. Corp., 831 F.2d 395, 
396 (2d Cir. 1987). 
 173. Rifino v. United States, 245 F.3d 1083, 1087–88 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 174. See Rafael I. Pardo & Michelle R. Lacey, The Real Student-Loan 
Scandal: Undue Hardship Discharge Litigation, 83 AM. BANKR. L. J. 179, 183 
(2009) (“Debtors who have filed for bankruptcy in the first instance as a result of 
financial distress must somehow find the resources to litigate a full-blown 
lawsuit in order to prove that their predicament qualifies them for relief from 
their student loans.”); see also 11 U.S.C. App. Rule 7001(6) (2006) (providing 
that a proceeding to determine the nondischargeability of a debt is an adversary 
proceeding). 
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Another problem in bankruptcy is that unlike many other 
nondischargeable debts, student loan claims are not given 
priority status, which would allow debtors to repay them in 
Chapter 13 ahead of general unsecured debts.175 The bankruptcy 
courts have attempted creative approaches to make Chapter 13 
work for student-loan debtors despite lack of clear statutory 
authority to pay these loans ahead of other unsecured debts.176 
The nondischargeability of student-loan debt absent undue 
hardship is permanent, a life sentence, but it has not always been 
thus. Student loans were dischargeable until 1976, when 
Congress made them dischargeable five years after they became 
due, absent undue hardship. Then in 1990, the waiting period 
was extended to seven years and in 1998 to an infinite ban, in 
each instance preserving the “undue hardship” exception.177 In 
2005, a major overhaul of the Bankruptcy Code left in place 
permanent nondischargeability, absent undue hardship, and 
added private student loans, not just federally guaranteed loans 
or direct federal loans, to the student loan nondischargeability 
                                                                                                     
 175. See 11 U.S.C. § 507 (2006) (listing priority debts and not including 
student loans); id. §§ 1322(a)(2), (4) (providing for full payment of priority 
claims in Chapter 13 to the extent the debtor can afford from projected 
disposable income).  
 176. See, e.g., In re Abaunza, 452 B.R. 866 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2011) (holding 
that an above-median-income debtor did not discriminate unfairly by paying 
more to a student loan creditor than to other unsecured creditors where the 
latter received their entitlements under the disposable income test of 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1325(b) and the student loan was paid from discretionary income in excess of 
disposable income under the means test); In re Harding, 423 B.R. 568 (Bankr. 
S.D. Fla. 2010) (disallowing the debtor to separately classify student-loan debt 
in order to pay it ahead of other unsecured debt but enjoining the student loan 
creditor from charging late fees, collection fees, and penalties during the 
Chapter 13 case); In re Boscaccy, 442 B.R. 501 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 2010) 
(following Harding); In re Webb, 370 B.R. 418 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2007) 
(permitting separate classification and regular monthly payments to student 
loan creditors during the case, even though general unsecured creditors were 
being paid 1% of their claims). 
 177. Pardo & Lacey, supra note 174, at 180–81 (concerning dischargeability 
of student loans until 1976 and then adoption of a five-year waiting period); 
Pottow, supra note 13, at 248–50 (concerning imposition of a five-year waiting 
period for discharge, absent undue hardship, in the Education Amendments of 
1976, a provision that was moved to the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8), 
in 1978, effective in 1979, with extension of the waiting period from five years to 
seven years in 1990 and then in 1998 to an infinite-year bar). 
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category.178 The nondischargeability of student loans after a 
waiting period in the years from 1976 to 1998 depended on a 
theoretical argument that former students might abuse the 
discharge by going to school and then filing in bankruptcy before 
getting a lucrative job, despite lack of evidence that this was 
actually happening.179 In 2005, nondischargeability was extended 
to private student loans, not just direct or federally guaranteed 
loans, where protection of the public fisc is part of the rationale 
(as with certain tax debts that are made nondischargeable).180 Of 
course, nondischargeability of private student loans could be seen 
as a way of promoting such credit by giving creditors who extend 
it more favorable treatment in bankruptcy; an example along 
these lines for another type of credit is the Chapter 13 rule 
against writing down home loans to collateral value, a rule that 
was originally written to promote home loans181 but during the 
mortgage crisis has stood in the way of principal reduction to 
reduce foreclosures and stabilize the housing market.182 
Satisfying a lobbying interest is another possible explanation for 
extending nondischargeability to private student loans. With 
rising student loan defaults in the current prolonged high 
unemployment period, however, private student loans might be 
an appropriate first target for reform to provide debt relief by 
making them dischargeable again as they were until 2005. 
Reinstating a five-year or seven-year waiting period for a 
discharge of even federal student loans would also be desirable. 
                                                                                                     
 178. Pottow, supra note 13, at 250. 
 179. Id. at 250–56. 
 180. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1) (2006). 
 181. See Nobelman v. Am. Sav. Bank, 508 U.S. 324, 332 (1993) (Stevens, J., 
concurring)  
At first blush it seems somewhat strange that the Bankruptcy Code 
should provide less protection to an individual’s interest in retaining 
possession of his or her home than of other assets. The anomaly is, 
however, explained by the legislative history indicating that favorable 
treatment of residential mortgagees was intended to encourage the 
flow of capital into the home lending market.  
 182. Jean Braucher, Humpty Dumpty and the Foreclosure Crisis: Lessons 
From The Lackluster First Year of the Obama Administration’s Home Affordable 
Mortgage Program (HAMP), 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 727, 781–85 (2010) (discussing the 
need for principal reduction to mitigate foreclosure losses by all concerned). 
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The term “mortgage” works metaphorically as applied to 
educational loans in light of the high and permanent bar to 
bankruptcy discharge currently in place. To the extent of 
nondischargeability of this debt in bankruptcy or otherwise, 
human capital is mortgaged for life. The situation of overindebted 
student-loan borrowers is actually worse than that of 
homeowners who cannot afford their loans. While home loans 
backed by some collateral value cannot be written down in 
Chapter 13, late payments can be made up over time in a 
Chapter 13 plan, something for which there is no clear and easy 
provision concerning student loans.183 In addition, homeowners 
who lose their homes during or after Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 do 
not remain personally liable on the debt after bankruptcy. A 
homeowner can give up the home, get a bankruptcy discharge, 
and move on. A college education is different in that it cannot be 
surrendered. There is no comparable release from personal 
indebtedness on student loans after bankruptcy to that for 
homes, absent an adversary proceeding that establishes undue 
hardship.184 
Because bankruptcy relief is difficult to come by, often debt 
relief under DOE programs is more promising. The first tier of 
relief for a student-loan debtor is to change repayment programs 
to make the payment more affordable, whether through longer 
term, graduated payments, or an income-contingent or income-
based plan.185 Loan consolidation, under a weighted average 
interest rate, may also bring down the monthly total payment.186 
                                                                                                     
 183. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2), (5) (2006) (prohibiting cramdown of loans 
secured only by a principal residence but providing for cure of arrearages); see 
also In re Labib-Kiyarash, 271 B.R. 189 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 2001) (holding that 11 
U.S.C. § 1322(b)(5) can be used to cure long-term student loans but only if there 
is no unfair discrimination against other unsecured creditors); supra notes 175–
76 and accompanying text (concerning lack of priority status for student loans, 
which makes separately classifying them and paying them ahead of unsecured 
creditors of debatable legality). 
 184. See supra 171–74 and accompanying text. 
 185. See Repaying A Loan, http://www.ombudsman.ed.gov/repayment.html 
(last visited Apr. 10, 2012) (discussing six repayment options) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 186. See Understanding Loan Consolidation: Is it the Right Move for You?, 
http://www.ombudsman.ed.gov/consolidation.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2012) 
(discussing possibility that a single payment on a consolidated loan may be 
lower than the total of payments on multiples loans) (on file with the 
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Deferments and forbearances are available for a variety of 
circumstances, although this relief is temporary.187 Debts may be 
discharged by the Secretary of Education for total and permanent 
disability or death.188 If student-loan debtors simply stop 
payment, they will be subject to collection,189 so it is important for 
students to seek solutions other than default. DOE explains: 
The common consequences of default include large fees—
collection costs that can add 25% to the outstanding loan 
balance—and interest charges; struggles to rent or buy a 
home, buy a car, or get a job; collection agency actions, 
including lawsuits and garnishment of wages; and the loss of 
tax refunds and even Social Security benefits.190 
Unfortunately, DOE relief is only available on loans under 
federal student loan programs. Private students loans are not 
covered by DOE debt relief programs. The new Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) has jurisdiction over private 
student loans,191 and both prevention of and remedies for 
overindebtedness are needed. As of early 2012, the CFPB’s advice 
to private student-loan borrowers who could not make payments 
was to contact their loan servicers to see what private relief 
programs may be offered.192 The agency also issued a Notice and 
Request for Information Regarding Private Education Loans and 
Private Education Lenders in connection with a study of private 
student loans that it is required to submit to Congress by July 
2012.193  
                                                                                                     
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 187. Get Payment Relief, http://www.ombudsman.ed.gov/relief.html. (last 
visited Apr. 10, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 188. Cancel or Discharge a Loan, http://www.ombudsman.ed.gov/can 
cellation.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 189. Defaulted Loans, http://www.ombudsman.ed.gov/loandefault.html (last 
visited Apr. 10, 2012) (concerning consequences of default) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 190. Gainful Employment Rule Analysis, supra note 11, at 34387; see also 
supra note 168 and accompanying text. 
 191. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, Title X (2010). 
 192. Student Debt Repayment Assistance, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/ 
students/repay/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 193. Request for Information Regarding Private Education Loans and 
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IV. Assessing the Government’s Role 
A. The Analogy to Subprime Mortgages 
There are some obvious similarities between the subprime 
mortgage crisis and the problem of subprime higher education. In 
both cases, there has been heavy selling of the American Dream, 
whether the dream is of owning a home or becoming a college 
graduate.194 Furthermore, predatory lending has been a feature of 
each phenomenon, involving a lack of care about or analysis of 
ability to pay and benefit.195 The poor, minorities, and the 
unsophisticated were targeted by both subprime complexes.196 
Both phenomena have led to high debt, high default rates, and 
long-term impact on borrowers’ financial well-being and access to 
and cost of future credit.197 
The Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act198 provides for regulation to make sure that 
packagers of mortgages and other securitizers have “skin in the 
game” for risky loans.199 There has been a similar problem of 
subprime higher educational institutions having little or no stake 
                                                                                                     
Private Educational Lenders, 76 Fed. Reg. 71329 (Nov. 17, 2011), available at 
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=CFPB-2011-0037-0001 (seeking 
comments for report on private education loans and lenders required under 
section 1077 of Dodd–Frank); see also Rick Hackett, Chime In On Private 
Student Loans, THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU BLOG (Nov. 16 
2011), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/blog. 
 194. See LYNCH ET AL., supra note 6, at 1. 
 195. See id. at 1–2 (discussing problem of educational institutions that “prey 
on our underserved population” and criticizing “access without success”); see 
also KATHLEEN C. ENGLE & PATRICIA A MCCOY, THE SUBPRIME VIRUS: RECKLESS 
CREDIT, REGULATORY FAILURE, AND NEXT STEPS 21–25 (2011) (concerning 
predatory lending during the mortgage bubble). 
 196. See ENGLE & MCCOY, supra note 195, at 21; see also supra note 6. 
 197. See ENGLE & MCCOY, supra note 195, at 142–48 (describing how 
subprime lending hit fragile neighborhoods and led to default and, as the 
economic consequences unfolded, also led to rising unemployment and poverty); 
see also supra Part II.E; supra notes 168, 190 and accompanying text 
(concerning high rates of default on student loans to attend for-profit schools 
and resulting consequences). 
 198. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 199. See id. § 941(b); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11(c)(1)(B) (2006) (calling for a 
“securitizer” to retain at least 5% of the “credit risk for any asset”). 
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in their students’ success. The career colleges have a nearly 
perfect system of avoiding skin in the game. When students get 
federal grant aid and student loans to attend college, the schools 
get paid up front and do not bear the loss when former students 
default later after leaving school.200 Some for-profit colleges give 
or arrange for private student loans on top of federal student aid, 
but this may be primarily to avoid problems with the 90% limit 
on revenues from Federal HEA funds.201 To evade that limit, for-
profit colleges can raise tuition, provide private student loans of 
just over 10%, and not care much if they collect on the private 
loans.202 Another strategy is enrolling some military and former 
military personnel whose loans do not come from federal higher 
education funding and thus don’t count for purposes of the 90% 
limit on revenue from federal student aid funds.203 
Lack of effective regulation enabled the bubbles in both 
subprime mortgages and subprime higher education. The 
cluelessness of credit rating agencies about the risks of subprime 
mortgages204 is analogous to the lack of effective oversight of for-
profit colleges by educational accrediting organizations, which the 
career colleges have worked to capture and manipulate.205 
Taxpayers paid for a bailout of subprime mortgage lenders and 
investors,206 but in the case of subprime higher education, the 
                                                                                                     
 200. Federal student aid funds are disbursed while students are in school; 
one method is per enrollment period, and under this method, once the student 
has completed 60% of a period (such as a quarter or semester), 100% of the 
funds are disbursed, even if the student later withdraws. 34 C.F.R. 
§ 668.22(e)(2)(ii) (2011). 
 201. See supra Part II.D (discussing for-profit college reliance on federal 
grant aid and student loans). 
 202. See supra Part II.D. 
 203. Hollister K. Petraeus, For Profit Colleges, Vulnerable G.I.’s, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 21, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/22/opinion/for-profit-colleges-
vulnerable-gis.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2012) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 204. See ENGLE & MCCOY, supra note 195, at 47–51 (discussing poor 
judgment of rating agencies during the subprime mortgage bubble and the 
incentives to rate mortgaged-back securities highly given an arranger-pays 
compensation system). 
 205. See HARKIN, EMERGING RISK, supra note 19, at 2; see also Eisman, supra 
note 6, at 29–30 (comparing higher education accrediting agencies to credit 
rating agencies and discussing trend of for-profit schools acquiring schools that 
are accredited to get their accreditation and also sit on the boards of agencies). 
 206. See ENGLE &MCCOY, supra note 195, at 111–16 (discussing passage of 
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prepayment of federal grant and loan funds to the colleges makes 
for a prepackaged bailout,207 leaving students and taxpayers at 
risk. In this way, the federal role in subprime higher education is 
even worse than in the subprime mortgage crisis because the 
government is directly pumping taxpayer dollars into institutions 
that it knows are generating low completion rates and high debts 
for students.208 
As has already been suggested,209 there is also an interesting 
comparison in the treatment of unmanageable debt in bankruptcy 
for mortgages as opposed to student loans, with student-loan 
borrowers actually getting less relief. Home-mortgage debt is 
dischargeable so that the borrower is not personally liable, but it 
must generally be paid in full to retain a home.210 However, a 
debtor who is willing to give up a home can discharge home-
mortgage debt. Student loans are nominally unsecured, but they 
are effectively secured by human capital and by 
nondischargeability; the law does not provide the release from 
personal liability on student loans that is available with home 
loans. One cannot give back a worthless education and thus walk 
away from it. A debtor can be hounded to the grave for student-
loan debt, no matter its ineffectiveness in improving the debtor’s 
income or other prospects. Unless the debtor can prove facts to 
meet the test for an undue hardship discharge, student-loan debt, 
including private student-loan debt, remains nondischargeable 
for life.211 
While subprime higher education is worse than subprime 
mortgages both in the prepackaging of the bailout and in the 
long-term indenture of former students, often with no way out, 
                                                                                                     
the Emergency Stabilization Act of 2008 in October of that year, creating the 
$700 billion Troubled Asset Relief Program, and the continued panic in financial 
markets until large sums of TARP funds were paid to major financial 
institutions to infuse them with capital).  Nearly all those funds have been 
repaid. See Jeff Bater and John Kell, With Fifth Third Out, Banks have Repaid 
99% of TARP, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 17, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB10001424052748704261504576205142438418336.html (last visited Apr. 10, 
2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 207. See supra note 200 and accompanying text. 
 208. See supra Part II.E. 
 209. Supra Part III.C. 
 210. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2), (5) (2006). 
 211. See supra notes 171–74, 177–84 and accompanying text. 
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there is one way in which the student loan problem is not as bad 
as the mortgage crisis. It is not as big.212 While private student 
loans are securitized and high risk, the risk seems to be relatively 
transparent to investors.213 Losses to taxpayers on federal 
student loans are substantial,214 but even if they get much worse, 
as seems likely, the risk is not nearly as large as in the risk in the 
mortgage bailout, although ultimately nearly all of that money 
was repaid by the banks.215 
B. The Questionable Policy of Relying on For-Profit Higher 
Education as the Means to Expand to Universal Higher Education 
In the post-war decades from the 1950s to the 1970s, it 
became common to think in terms of elite, mass, and universal 
higher education.216 These three categories roughly map onto 
three tiers of the California higher education system—the 
University of California (elite); the California State Universities 
                                                                                                     
 212. Total U.S. mortgage debt outstanding is about ten times total student-
loan debt. See U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 24; Dennis Cauchon, Student 
Loans Outstanding Will Exceed $1 Trillion This Year, USA TODAY (Oct. 25, 2011 
1:23 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/money/perfi/college/story/2011-10-19/stu 
dent-loan-debt/50818676/1 (last visited Apr. 10, 2012) (stating that total 
student-loan debt is expected to reach $1 trillion by the end of 2011) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). FinAid.org, which estimated the total 
student debt volume slightly more conservatively as still short of $1 trillion as of 
February 2012, maintains a student-loan debt clock showing the growing 
volume at a site “intended for entertainment purposes only.” Student Loan Debt 
Clock, FINAID, http://www.finaid.org/loans/studentloandebtclock.phtml (last 
visited Apr. 10, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 213. Matt Wirz, What Hedge Funds Can Teach College Students, WALL ST. J. 
(Nov. 12, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240529702042246045 
77030562170562088.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2012) (concerning rising risk 
associated with bonds backed by bundled student loans as default rates rose in 
the bad economy) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 214. Proposed Gainful Employment Rule Analysis, supra note 6, at 43622 
(noting that the government covers the cost of defaults on federal student loans, 
$9.2 billion in 2009, loans which then had a net present value of $1 billion based 
on historical collections on defaulted loans). 
 215. See supra note 206 (concerning the $700 billion TARP bailout in 
October 2008, which has nearly all been repaid). 
 216. Martin Trow, Reflections on the Transition from Mass to Universal 
Higher Education, 99 DAEDALUS 1 (1970), available at http://www. 
stor.org/pss/20023931. 
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(mass); and community colleges (universal).217 Obviously, private 
nonprofit universities and colleges also have a role to play in each 
of these categories. The categories can also be described in terms 
of percentages of the population with degrees; up to 15% (elite), 
16%–50% (mass), or above 50% (universal).218 
The federal government has embraced for-profit higher 
education as part of a push for a higher national rate of college 
graduation, currently stuck at the high end of the mass range.219 
Reliance on the for-profit sector as part of the overall plan for 
American higher education goes back at least to 1972, when 
Congress made proprietary schools eligible to receive federal 
student aid funds.220 Political explanations are apparent, 
including the massive lobbying of the for-profit industry221 and 
ideological commitment to “private” solutions, even if heavily 
dependent on federal government funding.222 Whether there are 
sound public policy justifications for reliance on for-profit 
education is a much harder question to answer. A recent study of 
trends in college spending expressed skepticism that expansion of 
the private sector, including nonprofit and for-profit colleges, will 
go far enough: “Most would say not: to make the huge increases 
in access and degree production that are needed in the future, we 
need to rekindle public willingness to invest in higher education, 
                                                                                                     
 217. Chris Armbruster, On Cost-Sharing, Tuition Fees and Income 
Contingent Loans for Universal Higher Education: A New Contract Between 
University, Student and State? 6 POL’Y FUTURES IN EDUC. 3, (2008), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract+910001. 
 218. Id. at 7. 
 219. See supra note 163 and accompanying text. In 2007, 40.4% of the U.S. 
population aged 25–34 had college degrees, associate and higher, making the 
United States tenth among the OECD countries. Patrick J. Kelly, Closing the 
College Attainment Gap Between the U.S. and Most Educated Countries, and 
Contributions to be Made by the States, Nat’l Ctr. for Higher Educ. (Apr. 2010), 
available at http://www.nchems.org/pubs/docs/Closing%20the%20U%20S%20% 
20Degree%20Gap%20NCHEMS%20Final.pdf. Canada, Korea, and Japan had 
the top three rates in the same 25–34 population, with college degree rates of 
55.8%, 55.5%, and 53.7%, respectively. Id. The attainment level in the United 
States has largely leveled off, with persons 35–44 in 2007 showing a slightly 
higher level of college degree attainment, 42.2%. Id. 
 220. See supra note 113. 
 221. See supra note 108. 
 222. See supra Part II.D.  
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even as we increase cost effectiveness and reduce the trend 
toward higher tuitions.”223 
A primary public policy reason for reliance on for-profit 
schools could be a hope of reducing the cost of production, in part 
by making students largely pay their own way with student 
loans. So a key question, for which there seems to be insufficient 
data due to lack of information about the for-profit sector’s 
finances, is whether for-profit schools really produce educated 
citizens with degrees at lower cost than alternatives, taking into 
account both the low graduation rates of for-profits, federal grant 
and loan aid subsidies to them, and default rates of their former 
students. Three-quarters of American higher education students 
go to public institutions.224 All public institutions are subsidized, 
but the subsidies have been declining as state and local 
governments faced budget crunches, even as more students 
attended these schools.225 In 2009, community colleges educated 
6.5 million students, the largest single sector of higher education 
with more than a third of students nationwide,226 and the cost of 
the education on average was about $10,000 per FTE student, no 
more than the average amount spent on elementary and 
secondary education.227 As community colleges added students, 
they also lost public subsidies and did not raise tuition as much 
as the cuts, resulting in cost-cutting affecting the education 
itself.228 In addition, more than another third of higher education 
                                                                                                     
 223. DONNA M. DESROCHERS & JANE V. WELLMAN, TRENDS IN COLLEGE 
SPENDING 1999–2009: WHERE DOES THE MONEY COME FROM? WHERE DOES IT GO? 
WHAT DOES IT BUY? 45 (2011), available at http://www.deltacostproject.org/ 
resources/pdf/Trends2011_Final_090711.pdf; see also  Cellini and Goldin, supra 
note 1 (raising a challenge to the for-profit sector based on the lower tuition at 
for-profit schools that do not receive federal student aid; however their data are 
perhaps of limited relevance to a goal of universal higher education in that the 
for-profit schools they studied that did not participate in federal student aid 
programs were typically non-degree-granting vocational programs). 
 224. Id. at 11 fig.2 (showing total public enrollment of nearly 77% of 
undergraduates in 2009). 
 225. Id. at 32–33 figs.13 & 14. 
 226. Id. at 10 fig.1. 
 227. Id. at 7; see also Extracts on Key Issue Areas From “Trends in College 
Spending, 1999–2009” at 1 (2011) [hereinafter Extracts], http://www.delta 
costproject.org/resources/pdf/trendsissuehighlights.pdf (last visited Apr. 10, 
2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 228. Extracts, supra note 227, at 3. 
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is provided by public institutions with programs through the 
doctoral or masters’ level.229 These schools lost even more subsidy 
and adjusted by raising tuition but managed to maintain 
expenditures on education by cutting elsewhere in their 
budgets.230 
Taking on a mortgage for a university education has become 
a common feature of late adolescent life in America, and for-profit 
college graduates have the highest debt.231 In 2010, total student-
loan debt volume rose above that of credit card debt for the first 
time, as a result of increases in the former and decline in the 
latter in the wake of credit constriction brought on by the Great 
Recession.232 College freshmen reported record levels of stress as 
they worried about their career prospects in relation to the debt 
they were incurring.233 The implications for household finance of 
entering adult life with an educational mortgage are profound, 
even for those who do not obviously fail. Among borrowers for 
postsecondary education, 48% say having to repay student loans 
makes it harder to pay bills and make ends meet and 25% say it 
is harder to buy a home.234 Predictably, these effects are worse for 
students with higher debts and lower success rates in completing 
programs, as is the case for those who attend for-profit schools.235 
Under a principle of worst things first, it makes sense to get 
                                                                                                     
 229. DESROCHERS & WELLMAN, supra note 223, at 7 (noting that public four-
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tougher on for-profit colleges, shutting down access to federal 
student aid funds for those with the lowest repayment rates and 
highest debt-to-income ratios to minimize these schools’ negative 
effects. 
V. Conclusion 
The growth of predatory for-profit higher education has been 
dramatically fueled in the last decade by an infusion of federal 
dollars in the form of federal grant aid and student loans. The 
for-profit sector is offering subprime higher education 
characterized by high price and high risk of producing only 
overindebtedness. The idea of a subprime higher education sector 
captures well many of its features as well as the similarities to 
subprime mortgages, in terms of cost, risk, value, and the 
population targeted by marketing. Looking back on the housing 
bubble, we can see that the push for expanded homeownership 
went too far. Many of those who bought homes with subprime 
mortgages became owners in name only; in reality, they had no 
equity and effectively ended up paying very high rent or 
defaulting and taking a blow to their credit scores. It would have 
been better if regulation had prevented the bubble. A very similar 
argument can be made about subprime higher education. Just as 
some of the new homeowners would have been better off 
remaining renters, some people would be better off not going to 
for-profit colleges. Predatory lending will not get us to universal 
college education. The federal funds going to this sector would be 
best used at the highest performing for-profit schools or otherwise 
at community colleges or other public institutions. Shutting down 
more predatory for-profit colleges is a sound strategy to contain 
the damage to students and the waste of federal resources, but 
the political challenge of doing so should not be underestimated. 
In this difficult context, DOE’s first step with the overly cautious 
Gainful Employment Rule is a small victory.  
